2015 Legislative Elections in Turkey. Cuma Çiçek. All rights reserved.Turkey left behind it a
thirteen-year-long period of single-party majority governments in the June 7 election.
AK Party (Justice and Development Party) lost its parliamentary majority as a
result of HDP (Peoples’s Democratic Party) success in overcoming the 10 percent
election threshold.
It is obvious that Erdogon is
the loser of the election and the HDP achieved a glorious success on the
evening of June 7. The election results put an end to the rise of Erdogan,
while it opened a new page for the HDP to provide a new focus of opposition at
the national level, and for the leading Kurdish national movement (KM) that
leads the party to reshape the Kurdish space beyond Turkey’s borders.
Before analyzing the
achievement of the HDP, let us remember the background of the HDP project that
emerged as part of the KM’s political strategy.
Dual strategy
H. Bozarslan, a leading
scholar working on the Kurdish/Kurdistan issue argues that the “Iraqization”
and “Kurdistanization” of the Kurds function as two parallel processes
supporting each other. He contends that the participation of the Kurds in political
and administrative processes at the Iraqi level (the Iraqization), has allowed
them to construct an autonomous space at the Kurdistani level (Kurdistanization).
Borrowing Bozarslan’s
concepts, I would argue that the KM has been following a similar trajectory in
Turkey since 2013 to reshape the political arenas at the level both of Turkey
and the Kurdish region. Although some Kurdish nationalists contend that the Turkey-ization
and Kurdistanization are two opposing political projects, the results of the
June 7 election confirmed that the autonomous construction of a political space
in the Kurdish region and the construction of Kurdish oppositions as an integral
part of Turkey’s politics are two interrelated parallel processes.
DBP, DTK and Kurdistanization
Since the foundation of the
HDP, BDP has re-organized itself as a regional party to construct an autonomous
political and administrative space in the Kurdish region. It changed its name
to DBP (Democratic Regions Party) and transferred its PMs to the HDP, while
keeping the local governments under its party structure. Alongside the DBP, DTK
(Democratic Society Congress) functions as the principal umbrella organization
of this construction process at the regional level. It comprises the DBP’s
local branches, the local governments, youth movement, women’s movement,
pro-Kurdish NGO networks, trade unions, media, and local assemblies in the
Kurdish region.
Both DBP and DTK have been
re-organizing themselves in accordance with eight aspects – political,
legislative, self-defense, cultural, social, economic, ecological and
diplomatic – of the democratic autonomy project.
According to the KM, democratic autonomy is a socio-political project that aims
to construct the Kurdish people’s self-government in their homeland. The eight
stars in the DBP’s flag symbolize these aspects of the democratic autonomy
project. The re-construction of the DBP and DTK at the regional level, the
reshaping their political agenda on the basis of the construction of Kurdish
self-government in the Kurdish region can be conceptualized as the
Kurdistanization strategy.
HDP, HDK and Turkey-ization
Kurdistanization was just one
side of the coin. There is another one: Turkey-ization. While the DBP and the
DTK signify the Kurdistanization of the KM, the HDP and the HDK (Peoples’s
Democratic Congress) denote its Turkey-ization process. The KM has led the
construction of the HDP and HDK as a new focus of left-wing democratic
opposition. With the participation of different left-wing, feminist and
ecological groups, parties and movements, ethnic and religious minorities, the
HDP and the HDK have been attempting to unify and represent all oppressed groups
in terms of the class, ethnicity/nation, religion, gender in Turkey with a
left-wing populist political agenda.
HDP: movement for equality on many levels
The HDP election manifesto and
its candidates represent its pluralist political identity in a striking way.
Equality on the basis of class, ethnicity/nation, religion/sect, gender and rights
advocacy for oppressed groups at multiple levels constituted the principal
perspective of the HDP election manifesto. It proposed a decentralized
pluralist administrative and political system based on the self-government of
different groups and identities, to guarantee equality across the country at many
levels. During the election campaign, it advocated a left-wing populist socio-economic
programme, gender equality, a pluralist and libertarian identity politics for
the ethnic/national and religious/sectarian groups, and the protection of the
environment and promotion of an ecologically sound society.
Alongside its political
discourse, the HDP has also promoted equality at multiple levels through its
candidates who have different political, ethnic/national and religious
identities. Alongside the Kurdish candidates, many Turkish left-wing
politicians/intellectuals and academicians; Arab, Armenian and Syriac candidates;
popular Alevi, democrat Sunni-Muslim, and Christian intellectuals, writers and
activists have found a place in the HDP list. Moreover, half of the HDP
candidates were women, and among the 80 elected candidates there are 31 women,
mostly feminist activists and intellectuals.
2015 elections: glorious success
The HDP has doubled the KM’s
votes in the June 7 legislative election. Despite different coalitions, the KM could
not get above 5-6% of the vote in previous elections since the 1990s. However,
the HDP took 13.12% of the votes and won 80 seats in the 550-seat parliament. This
must be seen as the vindication of both the Kurdistanization and Turkey-ization
strategies.
The new political map of the Kurdish region
The political map of the
Kurdish region changed in this election. The hegemony of the KM has both deepened
and expanded. The KM had remarkable support in the 15 provinces and was a
marginal political movement in the remaining 10 provinces in the Kurdish
cultural region in previous elections. The HDP expanded this “political region”
from 15 provinces to 20 overall in the June 7 election.
In this expanded Kurdish
political region, the HDP has marginalized the AK Party in many provinces. There
was a political balance between the KM and the AK Party in the Kurdish
political region, and the AK Party had the majority of Kurdish votes in the
large Kurdish cultural region in previous elections. Yet, in this election, the
AK Party lost the Kurdish voters’ support dramatically. The HDP is a hegemonic
power in the 12 provinces (55-87%), maintains the balance of power in 4
provinces (30-44%), and is a redoubtable opposition force in 4 provinces (15-23%).
Moreover, in “the non-political Kurdish cultural region” including 5 provinces
where pro-Kurdish socio-political and socio-cultural mobilization is very
marginal, votes for the HDP have also remarkably increased, although they are
under 10%.
The
rise of Kurdish support in the Turkish metropolis
Moreover, although the KM has
not been able to gain above 5% in the metropolises – except for Mersin and
Adana – since the 1990s, in this election, the HDP passed the threshhold in
Istanbul (12.60%), Izmir (10.54%), Adana (14.56%) and Mersin (17.90%); and came
close to the election threshold in Antalya (7.23%), Aydın (9.10%), and Kocaeli
(7.66%), while increasing its vote dramatically in Ankara (5.57%) and Bursa (5.85%).
As a result, the HDP won 21 parliamentary seats out of 80 from the metropolises
(See. Map).
The
source of HDP success
The source of HDP success comprises
principally the liberal, conservative, and right-wing votes. The HDP managed to
persuade the Kurds who were supporting the right-wing AK Party in previous
elections. The party doubled up its votes in the Kurdish political region while
marginalizing the AK Party. In the major towns, the CHP (Republican People’s
Party), the main opposition party, mostly kept its votes, and the HDP’s new
votes principally came from the AK Party.
Alongside the liberal,
conservative, right-wing votes, the Alevi Kurds who have a predominantly left-wing
political identity and orientation also mostly supported the HDP. In Dersim
(Tunceli), the symbolic center of the Alevi Kurds, the HDP took 59.91% in this
election, while it took only 22.96% in the previous election.
However, HDP success cannot be
reduced to Kurdish votes. The HDP has succeeded in becoming a new focus of the
opposition of liberal, democratic, reformist and revolutionary left-wing, as
well as feminist non-Kurdish people. The party’s candidates from different
parts of the society, and its pluralist and libertarian discourse underlining
multi-level equality, made it easy to mobilize different groups in the context of
the election campaign. The quantitative effect of each group may be limited,
yet their qualitative effect is enormous.
The dynamics of HDP success
How can one analyze this
success? Several trends must be noted.
First, the Kurdish national movements
have been rising in the Middle East since 2003, when Iraqi Kurdistan Region was
established. In 2012, the Kurds in Syria managed to establish three cantons in
Rojava (Kurdistan regions in Syria) and still control their homeland. These
events have changed the geopolitical equation of the Kurdish issue in the
region and affect Kurds from all over the world, and from Turkey in particular.
Moreover, the punishing war between Kurdish forces and ISIL both in Iraq and
Syria has been mobilizing Kurds from all over the world since the summer of
2014.
Indeed, the KM did not
increase its societal support just in the last election; rather, it has gradually
expanded and deepened its hegemony in Turkey over the last decade. One can
easily note the resurgence of the KM not just in local government and the national
parliament, but also in civil society networks, in media and in the streets. In
brief, HDP success cannot be understood without taking into consideration the
ongoing Kurdish spring in Iraq, Syria and Turkey over the last decade.
In this respect, the war
between the Kurds and the ISIL in Kobanê must be particularly noted. The Kobanê
war has become a “national” event mobilizing the Kurds and growing their
national feelings and thoughts all over the world. The AK Party’s sectarian and
nationalist policies in Syria and Rojava in particular, and its position during
the Kobanê war came as a shock to most of the Kurds supporting the AK Party.
Second, we must underline the
positions of the KM and AK Party concerning the peace process in Turkey. The KM’s
positive stance with regard to the peace process and the rise of a legal
democratic politics have strengthened the HDP. The open, sincere, reassuring
and stable role of the HDP in the ongoing peace process increased the party’s
credibility throughout society. Conversely, The AK Party, President Erdogan in
particular, adopted a narrow, insecure, and unstable position during the peace
process, and this has disappointed most of those who believed that the AK Party
will build peace and find a democratic and fair solution to the Kurdish issue.
In this respect, President Erdogan’s statements saying that there was no negotiation
table and opposing the monitoring committee for the peace process during recent
months must be strongly underlined.
Third, the HDP’s integrationist
policies in approaching socio-economic, ethnic/national, religious/sectarian
and gender-based inequalities and in advocating equality, liberty and pluralism
at many levels way beyond the Kurdish national struggle elicited a remarkable
response in many parts of the society. The Kurds who mostly live in the
metropolises and have already well integrated into Turkey welcomed this
political position in particular. This position also convinced non-Kurdish liberal,
democrat, left-wing, feminist, radical Muslim voters.
Fourth, the HDP libertarian
secularist position criticizing state control over religion, and emphasizing
religious rights as well as the equality of religions has considerably undermined
the AK Party’s influence over pious Kurds and banished the suspicions that
arose from governmental allegations to the effect that the HDP is
anti-religious party. Besides, the HDP’s intellectual Muslim candidates,
including several women wearing a headscarf, notably influenced people and
convinced them regarding the party’s libertarian secularism.
Fifth, the very successful HDP
election campaign led by co-president S. Demirtas’ performance must be
underlined. Unlike previous elections, the HDP organized a very influential
campaign. In this campaign, the effective usage of social media and the support
gained from some mainstream media played a very critical role in the HDP’s
success. In this regard, the rise of Demirtas as a young, sincere, honest, intellectual
and populist political leader opposing President Erdogan must be particularly
underlined.
Last but not least, many
voters made a strategic choice and supported the HDP in order to stand in the
way of Erdogan’s presidency. For the HDP to cross the election threshold was
the only realistic way of preventing the AK Party’s single-party qualified
majority stance that would allow the party to change the constitution
single-handed. Indeed, the HDP election slogan – that “we will not allow you to
be the president” – has played a critical role in the HDP success, preventing
the AK Party from forming a single-party parliamentarian majority.
