Migration policies: effective ways to address smuggling

Delegates from an Informal meeting of EU Heads of State or government gather at the Grandmaster's Palace in Valletta, Malta, February,2017. Leon Neal/Press Association. All rights reserved. Migrant smuggling into
and within the EU is taking place on an unparalleled scale and at a record
pace. The situation is dire. Understanding the state of play is important if we
are to arrive at a constructive and permanent solution. In addition, European
communities are expressing a plethora of doubts and this is reshaping the
political context.

The smuggling
phenomenon has a negative impact on communities in countries of origin, transit
and destination. It compounds and intensifies the dangers suffered by migrants.
It complicates and undermines efforts towards the development of an orderly,
safe and humane system through which legal migration can be conducted. A revamp
is needed, and this is precisely what the Maltese EU Presidency is striving to
achieve.

The Maltese EU Presidency

The migration
issue, in all its aspects, is one of the main priorities of the Maltese EU Presidency.

As a Union we are pursuing three objectives:

i)              
To broaden the EU consensus on a long-term
migration policy and apply the principles of responsibility and solidarity;

ii)            
To never allow a return of the uncontrolled
flows of 2015 and to further decrease the number of irregular migrants;

 

iii)           
To ensure full control of the Union's
external borders and get back to Schengen.

Within this context, two approaches are
required to address smuggling – to take action on the supply side and respond
to the demand side. The supply side calls for an effective policy of interdiction
and combating smugglers. On the demand side, there is the need to improve
conditions in countries of origin to remove the incentive. On the one hand,
this involves a more engaged and effective diplomacy to prevent or resolve
conflicts. At the same time, efforts must be intensified to ensure that
development assistance programmes are effectively directed towards improving
the living conditions of the countries of origin. This requires a collaborative
effort across different policy areas, something our country had been pushing
for within the EU
for years.

Overall, the number of irregular migrants
detected at EU borders decreased by around 70% between 2015 and 2016 as a
result of the decisive action which has effectively stemmed inflows via the
Western Balkans route. This is the outcome of the implementation of the
EU-Turkey statement and of measures to support the Western Balkan countries in
ensuring effective border controls.

Through the Facility for Refugees in Turkey,
the EU is delivering concrete results which go beyond stemming flows. We are
providing shelter, healthcare and education in Turkey to those who have fled
war and persecution in Syria. Furthermore, a number of those genuinely in need
of international protection are being resettled from Turkey to EU Member
States.

The
Central Mediterranean route

The Central Mediterranean route scenario is
somewhat different, thereby requiring an alternate approach. In the Central Mediterranean, too many people still put
their lives in the hands of smugglers and attempt the crossing, mainly from
Libya to Italy. They are fleeing economic hardship, and are not considered in
need of protection under international law. This necessitates a set of actions to tackle this issue.

At their informal meeting in Malta earlier
this month,
EU Heads of State or Government focussed on this external dimension of
migration. They discussed the situation in the Central Mediterranean route, and
adopted the Malta Declaration, which focuses on measures to stem the flow of
migration in the central Mediterranean.

In this context, they identified a set of
action priorities, including:

– Training, equipping and supporting the
Libyan national coast guard and other relevant agencies;

 

– Further efforts to disrupt the business
model of smugglers through enhanced operational action by involving Libya and
relevant international partners;

 

– Improving the socio-economic situation of
local communities in Libya, especially in coastal areas and at Libyan land
borders on the migratory routes;

 

– Seeking to ensure adequate reception
capacities and conditions in Libya for migrants, together with the UNHCR and
IOM;

 

– Supporting IOM in stepping up voluntary
return activities;

 

– Enhancing information campaigns aimed at migrants.

 

Together with the Commission and the High
Representative, the Maltese EU Presidency is now finalising a concrete plan for
the implementation of this declaration to take work forward and to ensure close
monitoring of results. This plan is to be presented to the Council at the
earliest opportunity. The European Council should review progress on the
overall approach at its meetings in March and in June 2017 on the basis of a
report from the Maltese EU Presidency. Whether this will prove to be effective
enough to disrupt smuggling activities and mitigate migration in the
Mediterranean, remains to be seen. Clearly, much depends on the situation
within Libya itself.

Other
tasks and challenges

In terms of the EU's other significant
accomplishments, as a practical step towards strengthening the EU's borders,
the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) was established in record time;
between December 2016 and January 2017 it set up operational pools for rapid
reaction and for returns. More than 1,500 border guards are available to be
deployed in joint operations at the external borders of Member States. To fill
gaps, especially in terms of equipment, the EBCG informs Member States of the
resources needed on a monthly basis.

The return of third country nationals who are
not entitled to remain within the EU remains a crucial element – not only is it
a question of credibility for the EU but it is also closely linked with
smuggling. While migrants succeed in remaining in the EU in spite of return
decisions, this fuels further irregular migration and encourages more migrants
to put themselves at the mercy of unscrupulous smuggling networks. A more
effective return policy should discourage migrants from embarking on the
journey and contribute to reducing the profit for smugglers.

A sustainable migration policy requires that
we address the root causes in
countries of origin and transit.

Addressing the root causes means people do
not feel the need to migrate in the first place, thereby suffocating the
smugglers’ demand and destroying the business model. In addition to other
policies, including the Valletta Action Plan, agreed at the Meeting of EU and
African leaders in November 2015, the EU institutions and Member States have
started working intensively with five priority countries of origin and transit
in Africa as part of the new Partnership Framework. The aim of this Partnership Framework is to improve border
management, discourage migrants from facing the risks of hazardous journeys,
facilitate returns and provide socio-economic alternatives.

These objectives are being mainstreamed into
other external instruments and policies of the EU and its Member States. In
December 2016, the European Council welcomed progress on the compacts and the
growing ownership of this process in the partner countries.

The EU is also reflecting on how the
objectives of the Partnership Framework could be translated into cooperation
with other countries. In this context, the Council reached a partial agreement
on the European Fund for Sustainable Development in December 2016, and work
with the EP is set to start very soon in order to have the relevant Regulation
adopted by May this year.

At the same time, we must not forget the
internal dimension which necessitates the effective application of principles
of responsibility and solidarity. In this spirit, the Maltese EU Presidency
will continue to lead the discussion on the review of the Common European
Asylum System with the aim of achieving as much progress as possible.

The 2017 CEPS Ideas Lab – a key annual event on EU policy organised by the Brussels-based think tank, the Centre for European Policy Studies – asked how such core EU challenges as Rights & Security can be implemented with respect for the EU rule of law and fundamental rights. Cooperating with openDemocracy, we bring the resulting debates to this dedicated page.