Image courtesy of María Elvira Espinosa Marinovich, via 070.
Post-conflict Colombia is diverse. All
the areas, territories and regions where the armed groups operated during the
conflict are now posing new challenges to the Colombian State – political
challenges which the country has not faced before because, until now, its
politics were primarily centered on and around the war.
The results of the study Rural Colombia Post-conflict 2017, conducted
by the Observatory of Democracy of the Universidad de los Andes with the support
and funding of USAID, highlights some of the challenges that Colombian authorities,
the government and society must face at this juncture.
The study analyzes several
municipalities in the Macarena area: in Caguán, in the south of Tolima and the north
of Cauca, in the Andén Pacífico and in the Lower Cauca, four regions which provided
the setting for the conflict and where the Agency for the Renovation of the
Territory (ART) is currently developing its territorial programs.
The post-conflict country is mostly
rural. Its level of schooling is low. It is a country where one in two
households lives on less than the minimum wage and where the levels of
victimization due to the armed conflict run very high.
It is these areas under these conditions
which the State must now reach. This is the first big challenge to be met.
The end of the conflict with the
FARC and the promise of the arrival of the State should generate certainty rather
than anxiety. There is much uncertainty, much distrust.
The second challenge is that this must be
done quickly, because expectations about what the State should provide are
growing.
Traditionally, people in these areas
have expected little or nothing from the State, given the precariousness of
their life conditions and the limited capacity of public institutions. Our
study of these territories in 2015 revealed that more than half of the people there
said they were satisfied with the way in which democracy worked and with the
education system. We are now sending them the message that the State,
investment and infrastructure are coming.
Expectations are growing and it is
important that they should be met. In some of the post-conflict regions,
citizens have begun to say that they are no longer satisfied with democracy and
the public services. They are now demanding more immediate responses from the
State. Public opinion is changing and State authorities are slow in arriving.
The third challenge is that the end of
the conflict with the FARC and the promise of the arrival of the State should
generate certainty rather than anxiety.
There is a lot of uncertainty, a lot of
distrust. The Peace Agreement is altering the local operational codes, for an actor
which generated certainty as regards social order is on its way out, and a
different sort of transition is happening in the post-conflict areas. In many
of them, we are witnessing a growing feeling of insecurity and distrust before
public institutions, such as the police.
In the area of Caguán and the Cordillera
Central (Tolima and Cauca) – where the FARC controlled and ruled the territory
-, what is currently happening comes close to what we imagine a post-conflict
situation to be like, where an armed actor is leaving, but others are not
necessarily coming in. The transition there seems to be smooth and calm.
But in
the Lower Cauca and the Andén Pacífico version of the same transition,
post-conflict looks more like a mutation of the conflict.
The FARC always fought with other actors
for the control of these territories. These other actors are still there today,
and this has increased insecurity and, therefore, uncertainty.
Another challenge has to do with
channeling an increase in civic activity and social demonstrations in these
territories. They could not demonstrate before, for citizen rights were restricted.
Popular mobilizations in these
territories represent a great opportunity, but also a challenge, for the
government and for the Colombian State in general, because the interests and
demands behind them must be channeled in a way that strengthens institutionally
established spaces.
A percentage of the population is
saying that if the police come in, the security conditions will worsen.
In addition, it should be a matter of concern that,
for those who live in these areas, it is not at all clear that the end of the
conflict means increased security. It is not clear that the arrival of
authorities, the police and the army, the presence of which was previously
sporadic, will generate better conditions for them.
A percentage of the population is saying
that if the police come in, the security conditions will worsen. This is still another
challenge: State authorities must generate trust and should not be seen as
external agents, totally alien to the communities.
Finally, there is the challenge of
avoiding, through the presence of the State, some corruption dynamics which
previously did not exist in these territories.
As the actor who delivered justice goes,
the perception that it is acceptable to take the law into one’s own hands and
pay bribes has increased. These indicators are on the rise and they begin to
level with the national average. The State must act quickly in order not to compromise
its legitimacy.
Public opinion data show that there is a
national consensus to the effect that the armed conflict must be resolved
through negotiation processes. But the challenges, the perceptions and the
needs of the part of Colombia that has not directly experienced the conflict
are different from those of the part where the FARC and other armed actors have
played a major role.
The results in these areas at the
forthcoming presidential elections in May will be crucial. It is key for
Colombia to have a government that sticks it out and stands for the
post-conflict agenda. Otherwise, these territories will suffer from indifference
and their needs will not be met.
But most serious still is the fact that it is
not they who will make this decision, but us, who have not lived the conflict directly
and for whom the post-conflict agenda seems not to be a priority.
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This article is being published as part of the partnership between 070 and democraciaAbierta. Read the original here.
