Preparing Iraq for the defeat of IS

The Iraqi army recaptured Mosul's historical al-Nuri mosque and its leaning minaret on June 29, 2017. Cheng Shuaipeng/Xinhua News Agency/Press Association. All rights reserved. The
territorial defeat of the Islamic State (IS) in Mosul is a significant moment
for Iraq, a country that has come a long way since IS was rapidly gaining
territory with such ease in the summer of 2014.

This
success was enabled by the fact that all sections of Iraqi society came together
in the face of a common enemy – a dynamic that needs to prevail if the country
is to cement IS’ defeat. IS still holds pockets of territory, with Hawija being
of particular importance, but it is only a matter of time before they return to
the shadows and the tactics of a non-territory-holding entity. Once they do, it
will be difficult to address, as many of the structural and political failures
that facilitated IS’ growth in Iraq will need to be gradually overcome,
beginning with the reluctance of the political elite to enforce change. Moreover,
there are a number of issues that have emerged as a direct reaction, and in
response, to the rise of IS and it is these issues that need to be addressed first
following their defeat.

Kurdish gains

As a
result of the fight against IS the Kurds have made significant territorial
gains, either through taking territory from IS (for example in parts of
Nineveh) or through filling the vacuum left by the Iraqi army’s withdrawal from
territory (for example in parts of Kirkuk). These disputed territories have
long been claimed by the Kurds, who have now taken the opportunity gained by
their control of these areas to call a referendum for independence on 25
September 2017.

A
people’s right to self-determination is one thing – although whether they are
in the political
or economic
position for independence can be questioned – but calling for independence for
territories that have long had
their constitutional status contested is another, much more problematic
matter, one that is complicated by the rise of militias in Iraq.

If a
deal is not reached on these territories, including one on hydrocarbon
management, it is possible that Iraq moves from one conflict with IS, to another
conflict with the Kurds over the control of territory, reversing all the gains
made by the IS defeat.

Rise of militias

In response
to the Iraqi army’s capitulation to IS in 2014 a whole
host of militias came to the fore in the battle
against IS. However, more recently the Iraqi army has made a dramatic recovery
to once again lead the fight. Nonetheless, the militias remain in place and a law
has been passed that legitimises their continued
existence. The multiple militias that exist in Iraq represent every fabric of
society (From Shiites following Sistani, to Christians, to Sunnis, to Shiites
with links to Iran) and herein lies the problem. The competition between
militias that is created for the support of the population builds divides in a
society that needs to come together to address the wider political and
structural issues.

Any
notion of a common Iraqi identity is destroyed through the rhetoric used by
these groups to gain popular support from segments of the society they claim to
represent. With elections planned for next year and several militias closely
linked or aligned to political parties, this issue becomes a larger concern,
which could further hamper democratic elections in Iraq. It is therefore
imperative that processes (such as disarmament, demobilisation and
reintegration, as well as security sector reform) to minimise the influence of
the militias and to strengthen the role of the army
are put into place.

Justice and reconciliation

A great number of atrocities have been committed
during the war against IS by many different actors and it is important to acknowledge
that all communities have suffered.  Ensuring justice for all the communities affected
by the conflict is an important step to allowing the population to move on.
However, it is also important that justice goes beyond retributive mechanisms and
that reconciliation is built into the process. Elements such as truth
commissions should be incorporated into the justice system and there needs to
be local ownership of the process in order to avoid retribution being exacted
in the future.

For communities to move on, the cycle of violence
needs to be halted. At the same time, there also need to be de-radicalisation
programmes focusing on undoing the damage caused to populations that have been
living under IS for up to three years in some cases – with the youth being
particularly affected. The above seems simplistic, but reconciliation in Iraq
is often ignored by the government and left to civil society and it is
important that this does not continue.

Reconstruction

Great physical and
material damage has been caused during the battle against IS, with the recent
destruction of al-Hadba minaret and the al-Nuri
mosque acting as a symbol of the indiscriminate nature of the devastation.

It is imperative
that action is taken to repair the damage – from rebuilding the villages, towns
and cities to providing basic services, such as electricity, water, medical
care and education. Reconstruction should not be politicised and patronage
policies and corruption must be avoided. Investment in the economies of the affected
areas is also extremely important, as without jobs there can be no hope of
economic security. Failure to demonstrate significant efforts of reconstruction
runs the risk of alienating large sections of the population, which in turn
could allow for radical entities to once again take advantage of local
disenfranchisement.

Political elites

The majority of
the issues discussed above require the political elites to come together and
reach agreements for the implementation of policies. Multiple segments of the
population, including at elite level, have come together in the fight against
IS and now the time has come for this effort to extend beyond the battle.

However, in Iraq,
like other societies involving power sharing, political agreements are
difficult to reach and policies are often politicised for the gains of
individual factions rather than the population as a whole. Therefore, reversing
the damage created by IS will be no easy task.

Nevertheless,
considering the fight against IS and the cooperation it fostered, and continues to foster against the
IS message, the population should be able to rally once more to set Iraq
back on the track of reform first promised by Prime Minister
Abadi when he was elected in 2014. Failure to do so will waste an opportunity
to rebuild Iraq from the ashes of IS defeat and will most likely lead to the
re-emergence of similar radical entities.