“Syria for everyone”, picture taken in Raqqa in April 2013. Picture by Beshr Abdulhadi. Flickr.com (CC BY 2.0). Some rights reserved.The war in Syria has had important consequences in the country in
terms of rising sectarianism and racism. In this in-depth article, I demonstrate the importance of a dynamic and open
understanding of citizenship.
Citizenship between theory and practice
Firstly, the concept of citizenship should not be understood as a
fixed concept, but as constantly in flux. Citizenship is not a
universally accepted concept, but differs from one country to
another. Some people limit the concept of citizenship to nationality,
some to political rights, while others go further to include
socio-economic, education, national and cultural rights. "Liberal"
systems for example have always resisted giving legal (and
constitutional) expression to the inclusion of social rights, such as
health care for all, thereby limiting their understanding of
citizenship to the right to vote and respect for private property.
At the same time, there is conflict between theory, and practice.
For example, the French Revolution greeted women as "citizens"
(citoyennes), but they had to wait until 1945 (in France) before
their complete political rights were recognized. Similarly, France,
and other western countries, continued the process of colonization
and denied the rights to people in their colonies. Also today,
stateless people and refugees are most often denied any rights
pertaining to citizenships, and are not even treated as human beings.
I argue that citizenship should not be linked to the issue of
nationality. A person living and working in a country, whether
holding its nationality or not, should be extended all the rights as
other citizens. This for example would allow Palestinians in Syria,
who had been living for more than 60 years in the country, to
participate in all sectors of society, in elections, etc… Indeed
how can we demand from Palestinians in Syria to take side with the
objectives of the uprising while not allowing them to participate in
the future of the society?
The struggle for an inclusive and pluralistic concept of
citizenship is a continuous one
The difference in the forms of citizenship and its understanding
are rooted in socio-economic and political conditions and reflect the
balance of social forces in a particular society. History shows that
this is a transforming concept with no precise definition, that has
always been at stake in struggles. Any broadening of citizenship to
include social, economic, cultural and national rights has been the
result of successful struggles from below including economic civil
rights, voting, unionizing, civil rights, gender equality, etc. all
were the result of numerous struggles. The dominant ruling classes
never willingly gave in to demands. We can see this particularly with
the Assad regime’s four decade long repression of the Syrian
population’s political, social, economic and national rights.
However, the improvements and broadening of rights in the concept
of citizenship is not linear. We see this clearly today in Europe
with the continuous rise of racism and islamophobia. Neoliberal
policies limiting the political, social and cultural rights of
people, particularly Muslim populations with the veil ban in French
schools or the imposition of a particular identity linked to a
so-called Christian and Jewish common heritage and culture, are all
examples of how citizenship is becoming more excluding.
The struggle for an inclusive and pluralistic concept of
citizenship is a continuous one. Philosophers like Jacques Rancière
and Hannah Arendt define democracy as a process of permanent
anti-oligarchic “insurrection” rather than as a stable regime.
Citizenship, is no different and requires a permanent struggle to
eliminate all forms of exclusion, whether cultural, social, ethnic,
or religious, etc…
In order to build an inclusive and pluralistic citizenship in
Syria, it is important to clearly point out the responsibilities of
the current situation in the country. The Assad regime is the main
actor responsible for the killing, displacement and destruction as
well as being the key in the rise of sectarianism and racism in the
country. Assad’s regime was accustomed to playing the “sectarian
card” and more generally “primordial identities” (racism and
tribalism) to divide the Syrian people and put the different groups
against each other in order to maintain its rule.
In fact, the regime is far from being secular, as presented by
some. It has promoted a constitution with an Arab chauvinist
discourse, reserving the position of President to the Muslim faith,
while in 2012 Islamic jurisprudence became a primary source of
legislation, instead of a main source of legislation. These are only
some of the many examples that show the lack of any kind of secular
nature of this regime.
Since the first days of the uprising, the regime has targeted the
peaceful, non sectarian and democratic activists. Many of them were
arrested and tortured to death in prisons, others had to flee the
country out of fear of the repression while others were killed.
Meanwhile, the regime released Islamic fundamentalist groups and
allowed their development at the expense of democratic groups.
Today no major political or armed force in Syria is offering an
inclusive and pluralistic project of citizenship.
This being said, foreign actors such as Iran, Turkey, or the Gulf
Monarchies, as well as sections of the opposition in exile gathered
around first the Syrian National Council (SNC), then the Etilaf, and
Islamic fundamentalist movements have also played a role in the rise
of sectarianism by deepening the divisions among various ethnic and
religious groups in the country during the uprising.
Today no major political or armed force in Syria is offering an
inclusive and pluralistic project of citizenship. The High
Negotiations Commission (HNC) for the Syrian Revolution and
Opposition Forces has failed in reflecting the democratic and
inclusive message of the revolutionaries and the popular movement
since the beginning of the uprising. In Autumn 2016, its vision
within an Executive Framework for the Political Solution in Syria
that was far from offering an inclusive and pluralistic citizenship
as we can see in its first article:
“Syria is an
integral part of the Arab World, and Arabic is the official language
of the state. Arab Islamic culture represents a fertile source for
intellectual production and social relations amongst all Syrians of
different ethnic backgrounds and religious beliefs as the majority of
Syrians are Arabs and followers of Islam and its tolerant message
which is distinctly moderate”.
This is of course exclusionary for
all ethnic and religious minorities in the country, in addition to
all people not identifying with these identities. The Etilaf and many
of the personalities linked to it have also promoted a sectarian,
racist (particularly against Kurds), and authoritarian discourses and
behaviors. Similarly, when it comes to women, the Etilaf has
completely neglected their large participation in the uprising,
providing them with only “decorative positions” without any
effective role in the decision making process.
The various Islamic fundamentalist movements
(such as the jihadist organization of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, the
salafist organisations Ahrar al Sham and the Islam Army, as well as
others such as the Muslin Brotherhood who call for a civil state but
in practice support the creation of an Islamic state with the
implementation of Shari’a) defend an Islamic State despite their
differences on how to reach this objective or the nature of this
state. This is of course an exclusionary project for various groups
such as religious minorities, women, or those who have a different
understanding of Islam, etc… Their sectarian and authoritarian
practices have also confirmed this pattern.
For a big majority of Kurdish political parties and
activists, Rojava is only a new form of authoritarianism rather than
democratic confederalism in action
The last main actor is the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is
more complex to analyze, but in my mind did not provide an inclusive
and pluralistic citizenship model, despite its “social contract”
and political discourse promoting theoretically these ideas. In the
areas controlled by the PYD, there has been progressive advances that
must be acknowledged such as the promotion of women rights and gender
equality, secularisation of laws and institutions, and to a certain
extent some forms of coexistence between the various ethnicities and
religious sects, despite some tensions.
The possibilities for the
Kurdish people, long oppressed in Syria, to manage territories in
which they are a majority is another positive thing in the framework
of support for their self-determination. However, without entering
into details there are a series of problems. Institutions in PYD
controlled areas, such as Rojava for instance, have been dominated by
PYD-affiliated organisations, with an assortment of Arab, Syriac and
Assyrian personalities who had little to lose from entering the
project.
For a big majority of Kurdish political parties and
activists, Rojava is only a new form of authoritarianism rather than
democratic confederalism in action. At the same time, these new
institutions lack legitimacy among large sections of the Syrian Arabs
in these areas, although an Arab president had to be elected to the
male/female joint presidency of the town’s local council. For
instance Shaykh Humaydi Daham al-Jarba, the head of a tribal Arab
militia and outspoken supporter of the Assad regime, was nominated as
the governor of the Jazirah canton in Rojava in 2014. His son became
the commander of the al-Sanadid Forces, one of the main Arab militias
fighting alongside the PYD-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
Prominence of tribal leaders in the Rojava institution was also
preserved, rather than challenged.
Furthermore, human rights
violations against Arab, Assyrian and Kurdish civilians have also
been documented in the area. The authoritarianism of the PYD was
demonstrated in its repression and imprisonment of activists,
political opponents and the closure of critical organizations or
institutions. Lately, this repression against other Kurdish political
groups and activists has even increased.
This is why I believe that there is no significant political
movement today, which is providing an inclusive and pluralistic
citizenship able to unite the various components of the Syrian
people. In my opinion, to reach a broad understanding of citizenship
including the social, political, national and economic rights of the
Syrian people, three main issues must be tackled: political rights
(democracy, self organization and equality), socio-economic rights
(social justice and inequality) and the issue of self determination
of the Kurdish people in Syria. I have chosen these issues because
they are based on the political and social experiences accumulated by
large sections of the Syrian people involved in the uprising in the
past five years.
Democracy and equality
In the first two years of the uprising, the dominant message from
the large popular movement with its demonstrations and statements was
an inclusive and democratic discourse that is not threatening for a
majority of Syrians. This movement challenged the rhetoric of the
regime as being the only barrier against extremism. In addition to
this, the local councils and coordination committees played the role
of an alternative institution to the state by providing services to
local populations, and created a situation of dual power where the
authority of the state disappeared. These two elements created the
conditions to present a political alternative appealing for large
sections of the population with the capacity to become hegemonic
against the propaganda of the regime portraying them as a foreign and
sectarian conspiracy.
Participation from below, by the underprivileged and popular
classes in managing their societies at all levels has been the most
significant element in the uprising.
Experiences of participation of local populations in decisions
pertaining to society at all levels multiplied. The experiences of
the “liberated” areas and local popular councils are in this
perspective something to maintain in any concept of citizenship. In
fact. participation from below, by the underprivileged and popular
classes in managing their societies at all levels has been the most
significant element in the uprising.
According to a survey by the independent Syrian-led civil society
organization The Day After Tomorrow (TDA), conducted between November
2015 and January 2016, the population actually wanted to maintain
this experience. This is visible in the expressed support for some
form of decentralization in a way to,
“endorse the allocation of broad competencies to local
authorities, and this support explicitly increases in opposition-held
areas (if) compared with regime-controlled areas. It seems that the
absence of the state in opposition-held areas has contributed to
increased support for decentralization, and the spread of positive
perceptions about it (…) (especially) the idea that it enhances
‘participation in governance’ tops the list of advantages.”
The issue of equality must also be put forward in order to
challenge the patriarchal structures of society. In the first two
years of the uprising, the involvement and participation of women was
a very important element, breaking many conservative social codes and
overcoming traditional barriers. Female activists often agree that
the beginning of the revolution opened the door for women to
challenge restrictive social conventions, whether they were legal,
familial, religious or social. On Women’s Day, March 8, 2012, the
female activists of the youth movement Nabd for example issued a
statement that read:
“We, the revolutionary women of Syria, address the regime on
Women’s Day saying: Our revolution will continue until we have each
and every single one of our usurped rights, like a woman’s right to
nominate herself for presidency and to grant her nationality to her
children”.
Political rights guaranteeing the participation and
self-organization of local populations at all levels of society must
be guaranteed in a new concept of citizenship, and not limited to the
right to vote and choose its representatives in elections every few
years. Similarly, the issue of equality must also be put at the
center of any new struggle for a pluralistic and inclusive
citizenship.
Social Justice
Social justice and the redistribution of wealth in the country is
another necessary step towards an inclusive citizenship that should
not be limited to the upper class in urban centers.
Regional structural injustices
existed before the uprising in 2011
Before the uprising, the upper class and
foreign investors were satisfied with the state’s neoliberal
policies. This was especially true for investors from the Gulf
monarchies and Turkey, which were not hostile to the Assad regime
prior to the revolution, at the expense of the vast majority of
Syrians, who were hit by inflation and the rising cost of living,
while public services and investments (health care, education,
housing) were diminished considerably.
Regional structural injustices
existed before the uprising in 2011 and increased with the
accelerated adoption of neoliberal policies by the regime of Bashar
al-Asad. On the eve of the upheaval, the proportion of poor people
was higher in rural areas (62%) than in urban ones (38%). Poverty was
more widespread, more rooted and more marked (58.1%) in the
north-west and north-east (the provinces of Idlib, Aleppo, Raqqa,
Deir Ez-Zor and al-Hasakah), where 45% of the population lived. Just
over half (54.2%) of all unemployment was found in rural
areas.
In addition to this, before the beginning of the popular uprising,
the geographic concentration of business was as follows:
Governorates distribution for micro enterprises (less than 5
workers):
– Damascus and Rural Damascus: 27.36%
– Aleppo 21.72%
– Homs 9.93%
– Hama 6.06%
– other governorates 34.93% (10 other governorates)
while governorates distribution for small enterprises (between 5
to 14 workers)
– Damascus and Rural Damascus: 29.40%
– Aleppo 41.55%
– Homs 5.89%
– Hama 4.70%
– other governorates 18.46%
Foreign private investments were also concentrated in the two
cities of Damascus and Aleppo in unproductive sectors (real estate,
tourism, services such as bank insurance companies), while other
regions and rural areas were left out of any kind of economic
development and of provision of services. In addition to this the
most impoverished areas of the country were the areas mostly
populated by Kurds such as in the north-eastern Jazirah province.
Jazirah was the region with the highest level of illiteracy and
poverty, hosting 58% of the country’s impoverished population
before the occurrence of the 2006 drought.
In 2010, poverty increased considerably, reaching 80 per cent of
the Jazirah inhabitants, as the impact of four consecutive droughts
since 2006 had been dramatic for both small-scale farmers and
herders. In addition to this, the Jazirah region produced two thirds
of the country’s grains (and 70% of wheat) and three quarters of
its hydrocarbons. Despite the industrial underdevelopment of the
Jazirah, and the scarcity of industrial installations in the region,
which accounted for only 7% of the overall sector, this plain was
nevertheless important. For example, 69 percent of Syria’s cotton
was produced in the region, but only 10 percent of cotton threads
were spun there. Of course, all ethnic groups in the area, Arabs,
Syriacs-Assyrians, and Kurds, suffered from economic marginalization.
There has been a
continuous impoverishment of rural areas since the 1980s
The most important component of the Syrian uprising was actually
that of economically marginalized rural workers, and urban employees
and self-employed workers, who have borne the brunt of the
implementation of neoliberal policies, in particular since the coming
to power of Bashar al-Assad. The geography of the revolts in Idlib,
Deraa and other mid towns, as well as in other rural areas, all
historical strongholds of the Baath party, and which benefited from
the policies of agricultural reforms in the sixties and had not
played a large role in the insurgency of the early 1980s, including
the suburbs of Damascus and Aleppo, showed the involvement of the
victims of neoliberalism in this uprising.
There has been a
continuous impoverishment of rural areas since the 1980s and the
droughts from 2006 accelerated rural exodus. This situation was
exacerbated by an annual population growth of around 2.5 percent.
This growth affected particularly small rural mid towns, in which the
population often multiplied by five to ten times since the 1980s,
while public services provided by the state did not increase but
rather diminished with the neoliberal policies, leading local
populations to lack or witness a deterioration of their living
conditions. In the main towns of Damascus and Aleppo, the geography
of revolts was nearly similar to their socio-economic divisions. Many
bourgeois and middle class Aleppo urbanites used to characterize the
protesters in the first demonstrations at the university and rural
Aleppo as “Abu Shehata” (derogatory term meaning literally
“Father of slippers” insulting the social class of the
protesters).
Similarly again, these neoliberal policies had
particular and deep consequences on women, especially when it
comes to their access to the labour market. The total number of women
in the work force decreased since the mid 1980s, while it was growing
before essentially because of the state controlled public economic
sector. There was definitely an important gender dimension to the
unemployment before the uprising in 2011, with unemployment rates
among young women almost twice as high as those among young men. The
unemployment rate in 2007 was estimated at 22.6% (14.5% for men, and
53% for women). The rate increased to 30.3%, if non-citizens are
accounted for.
In addition, 50% of young women in Syria (aged
between fifteen and twenty-nine) were neither in the labour force nor
in school, suggesting potential barriers to labour market entry.
Women’s participation in the labour force was 18%. Women lost
around 50% of their total jobs between 2001 and 2007, and were pushed
away from the labour force. The state-owned sector (government and
state-owned companies) created 119,000 jobs between 2001 and 2007
(52% of which were for women); while the private formal sector lost
77,000 new jobs; men gained 77,000, but women lost 154,000. Most
urban labour markets were mainly constituted by informal employment,
with no social/maternity protection for women. By the year 2006, 25%
of workers in the public sector were women, while in the private
sector, only 8 percent were women. According to the 2008 labour force
survey the majority of employed women (55%) work in the public
sector.
Neoliberal policies had
particular and deep consequences on women, especially when it
comes to their access to the labour market.
The issue of wealth redistribution in society and across the
different regions will have to be tackled in any future political
system in Syria. On this perspective, the Etilaf economic policies
are problematic because they support the same neoliberal policies of
the Assad regime against the interests of the underprivileged
classes. The socio-economic injustices in the society and across
regions must be linked to the democratic issue.
The Kurdish Issue
It is absolutely necessary to tackle the Kurdish issue in order to
be able to provide an inclusive and pluralistic citizenship embraced
by all in Syria. The large majority of the Kurdish parties – as
well as of the Kurdish population in Syria – are not satisfied by
the way most Arab opposition political parties consider the Kurdish
issue as simply and uniquely a citizenship issue. In other words, the
Arab opposition believes that Kurds are normal Syrian citizens who
have been deprived of some of their rights and that the problem is
therefore limited to the single issue of the census of 1962, which
resulted in around 120 000 Kurds being denied nationality and
declared as foreigners, leaving them, and subsequently their
children, denied of basic civil rights and condemned to poverty and
discrimination.
There were between 250 000 and 300 000 stateless
Kurds in the beginning of the revolution in March 2011, roughly 15
percent of the estimated two million total Kurdish population in
Syria. The large majority of the opposition political parties have
not been ready in any way to recognize the Kurds as a separate
“people” or “nation” and are not ready nor willing to listen
to demands for federalism and administrative decentralization. The
demand for a federal system in Syria is a demand of the quasi
majority of Kurdish parties in the country despite their political
differences and rivalries.
We have to understand that the demand for a federal system by the
Syrian Kurdish political parties is rooted in decades of state
oppression, and this since the independence of the country in 1946,
on a national basis (policies of quasi systematic discrimination
against Kurds, policies of colonization in the framework of the “Arab
Belt” and cultural repressions at all levels), but also has
socio-economic consequences.
According to a survey conducted
between November 2015 and January 2016 by the TDA, respondents
in both regime (86.7%) and opposition-held areas (67,4%) agree on
rejecting federalism, while proponents of federalism almost reach a
consensus in Kurdish-led Self-Administration areas (79.6%). These
results show that a Kurdish-Arab divide exists and that the first
imperative regarding any future political system in Syria is dealing
with the “Kurdish issue”, although it is not the only
requirement.
No solution for the Kurdish issue or an inclusive
Syria can be found without recognizing the Kurds as a proper “people”
or “nation” in Syria
The majority of the Syrian Arab opposition did not address or even
acknowledge this reality, thereby mirroring the regime’s position.
In general, no solution for the Kurdish issue or an inclusive
Syria can be found without recognizing the Kurds as a proper “people”
or “nation” in Syria and providing unconditional support to the
self-determination of the Kurdish people in Syria and elsewhere; this
clearly does not mean being uncritical of the policies of the
leadership of the PYD or any other Kurdish political party.
The elimination of the Kurdish issue from the discussions under
the pretext that it allows more unity within the opposition and less
problems, is actually a recipe for division and lack of confidence
between the various components of the Syrian people.
By recognizing the Kurdish people we make a move forward towards
building a new society and citizenship not based on an ethnicity, but
one that recognized the various peoples constituting Syria:
Armenians, Palestinians, Syriacs, Assyrians, Turkmens, etc….
Conclusion
The basis for any future inclusive and pluralistic citizenship in
Syria must include the democratic and social empowerment of the
popular classes to manage their own societies.
In this perspective, a possible decentralized and/or federal state
could best answer some of the issues discussed in this article,
notably by respecting the principle of self determination of the
Kurdish population in providing more tools and power to manage their
affairs, on the one hand, and in trying to correct regional social
injustices, on the other. Such an option would also strengthen
participation and self-organisation from local populations in
decision-making processes.
However, the implementation of a decentralized or federal state is
not a guarantee per se to achieve an inclusive and democratic system.
Indeed, all future options in Syria, whether federal, decentralized
or otherwise, will need to take into account these issues in a
secular political framework encouraging the participation from below
of the popular classes and in which democratic and social rights of
all Syrians without gender, ethnic and religious discrimination are
guaranteed. This means notably providing the popular classes with the
right to organize politically in their workplaces, society, and
neighborhoods, and to defend their interests.
This is also the only way to prevent foreign states from
instrumentalizing particular religious sects or ethnicities for their
own political interests, while fueling sectarianism and racism.
Reaching these goals requires new struggles at all levels of
society when it comes to democratic, social and national issues. This
also requires working towards the unity of democratic and progressive
actors and movements against the different counter revolutionary
forces, whether these are the authoritarian regimes or the Islamic
fundamentalist movements. There is therefore a need to build an
independent front away from these two forms of reactionary forces and
against all forms of discrimination. Such a struggle for radical
change in society is a dynamic from below in which the popular
sectors of society are the agent of change.
The issue at the core of building a new inclusive and pluralistic
citizenship is to protect the freedom and dignity of the people as
the popular movements have demanded since the beginning of the
uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa in 2010-2011, including
in Syria, against authoritarian and unjust regimes.
