RAF veteran John Watkins, 89, from Boston, Lincolnshire, marking the 70th anniversary of VJ Day. Jonathan Brady/Press Association. All rights reserved.
In National
Populism: the Revolt against Liberal Democracy, Matt Goodwin and I examine
the factors which lie behind major political developments such as: the Brexit
vote, Donald Trump’s victory, and the growth of political parties like the French
National Rally (formerly National Front), the Austrian Freedom Party, the
Alternative for Germany and the League in Italy, whose entry into government in
2018 has been followed by its rise from third to first place in opinion polls.
Two broad academic
interpretations have emerged to explain these developments. The first stresses
economic change and its effects on ‘the losers of modernisation’/the ‘left
behinds’. The second, and more common, approach holds that the key driver has been
cultural. The rise of parties like the National Front began well before the
onset of recession, and some of the strongest can be found in rich countries
like Austria. For the culturalist approach, support is fired by opposition to
immigration and by linked themes like law and order. This
polarised debate glosses over an important further factor – namely, attitudes
towards mainstream parties and liberal democracy generally.
However, this polarised
debate glosses over an important further factor – namely, attitudes towards
mainstream parties and liberal democracy generally. Liberal economic and
political elites are frequently blamed for the onset of recession and austerity
in many countries. There is also a widespread belief that mainstream
politicians have failed to conduct an open discussion about immigration, that
they have even lied about numbers and impacts. A 2017 Ipsos poll found that in
Britain politicians were the least trusted profession, with just 17% expressing
faith in them, while once-derided weather forecasters were trusted by 76%.
Attitudes to immigration in
Britain
Let’s start by
looking briefly at recent trends in Britain. Certainly immigration has been at historically
high levels. It has also encompassed what academics call ‘hyper-diversity’,
including the arrival of new groups which some voters fear cannot be
assimilated. In the case of Muslims, this xenophobia is reinforced by fears
about terrorism.
There are clear examples
where recent voting has been influenced by such changes. Take Boston in
Lincolnshire, which saw a tenfold increase in the number of non-British EU citizens
between 2001 and 2011, often arrivals from new member states in eastern Europe to
work in the food-picking and packaging industries. In the 2014 European Parliament
elections UKIP gained over 50% of the vote here, its best local result. If we
look at opinion polls, we see that the percentage of British people who
believed that immigration was a major issue rose from 7% at the turn of the new
millennium to 48% in 2016, making it top of the list of voters’ concerns at the
time of Brexit. The precise relationship between
voting and immigration, however, is complex.
The precise relationship
between voting and immigration, however, is complex. Concerns are often
greatest in areas where people have recently arrived, or where there are fears
about such an influx. On the other hand, the Brexit vote was often lowest in
parts of Britain, like London, which have relatively large ethnic minorities.
Part of the explanation of this diverse pattern can be found in social-psychological
‘contact theory’, which holds that over time people from different ethnic
groups accommodate to each other through direct interaction.
Opinion poll
evidence also needs to be interpreted in the light of the behavioural economics
concept of a ‘heuristic’, which refers to the way in which people often solve
complex problems with simple answers. Telling pollsters that ‘immigration’ is
the major issue can hide a variety of concerns, as a
recent Guardian article by Aditya
Chakrabortty reveals. When he visited Llanhilleth before the 2016
referendum, he found that the ‘rote’ reason for supporting Brexit was
‘immigrants’, in spite of the fact that in this South Wales former mining village
‘the only foreigners were inside the Daily Mail’. However, anger wasn’t
directed at immigrants or Eurocrats so much as at British governments, which
neither cared about nor listened to people like them. In
this South Wales former mining village ‘the only foreigners were inside the
Daily Mail’.
Make no mistake,
immigration is undoubtedly a major concern for many voters. But only a very
small percentage seek a widespread ban on immigration, let alone hold truly
racist values in the sense of believing in a hierarchical division of the world
based largely on colour and/or hatred.
This is confirmed
by the September 2018 National Conversation on Immigration report. Its online survey,
which was open to anyone, produced highly polarised replies about the benefits
of immigration. But its representative sample revealed only 15% who were highly
supportive of, or strongly opposed to, immigration – with the extremes split
roughly equally. The vast majority of British people are ‘balancers’ who
recognise the rights of genuine asylum seekers and need for migration, but who
voice concerns like:
1) the skill sets immigrants should have.
2)
the
impact they have on localities, especially in the short run.
3) the extent to which they should be
expected to assimilate into the dominant culture, which many people still strongly
identify with (though their conceptions of Britishness often differ). Their conceptions of Britishness often differ.
We need to be
wary that ‘representative’ opinion polls may fail to pick up the racist views
of some respondents, who have become aware of what are socially acceptable
responses about immigration (unlike online platforms and straw polls which tend
to be dominated by extremes). Such polls may also not pick up what academics
term ‘implicit racism’, namely biases and stereotypes such as homogenising all
Muslims. Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence from studies of diverse
activities, from football crowd behaviour to the growth of mixed marriages, that
British people generally are far more tolerant than over a generation ago. In
2018 a Royal Prince married a mixed-race bride who is foreign, and it is
inconceivable that there could be a repeat of the behaviour of a section of
Liverpool football fans in the 1980s when they greeted a new star black striker
by throwing banana skins onto the pitch.
Immigration and democratic
renewal
The National Conversation
survey found that only 15% of British people thought that governments had
managed immigration competently and fairly, a dismal figure which reflects a widespread failure of
communication.
Since the
beginnings of large scale immigration in the late 1940s, mainstream politicians
have typically been loathe to speak openly about it. This partly reflects fears
that this could involve taking potentially vote-losing positions and/or worsen
community relations. But it also stems from the deep-rooted suspicion of the ‘masses’
which lies at the heart of liberal democracy, a fear which National Populism: the Revolt against Liberal Democracy charts over
centuries.
A common response
to the rise of parties like UKIP is to brand them as ‘racist’, even ‘fascist’. These
charges do not just come from self-styled ‘anti-racists’/’anti-fascists’.
Symptomatically, in 2006 David Cameron dismissed the rising ranks of UKIP as
full of ‘fruitcakes, loonies and closet racists’. Some national populist supporters
undoubtedly wear the racist badge with pride, but most see themselves as
raising legitimate issues and resent the extremist charge. As a result, they often
react by becoming further alienated from what they see as overweening liberal elites
and their Politically Correct agendas. Most national
populists see themselves as raising legitimate issues and resent the extremist
charge.
These last observations
point to two ways in which we should move on. Looked at from the top-down, we
need politicians to be braver, to lead and talk more openly about immigration
policy. We need them to explain the labour needs of the British economy. There
is widespread support for immigrants such as doctors and nurses, but many
oppose unskilled immigration. However, whilst automation will reduce the demand
in towns like Boston, the need for unskilled workers in places such as in care
homes is likely to grow given the ageing population. There also needs to be a
greater attempt to dispel wider fears of the type challenged by the Migration Advisory
Committee report in September 2018, when it found no evidence that European
migration ‘has reduced the average level of subjective well-being’ in
communities. We need politicians to be braver.
Boston, Lincolnshire, panoramic view, 2007. Wikicommons/ Tanya Dedyukhina. Some rights reserved.From the bottom-up,
we need groups and individuals to talk more about immigration and how best to
live together. Precisely what kind of immigration rules should we apply? Do we
need to set out a new and more inclusive conception of national identity? If the
latter is important, it will need to combine old aspects of British identity
with the new realities of migration and multicultural communities. It will need
to built on a sophisticated understanding of psychological theories concerning
attitude change. ‘Confirmation bias’ theory shows us that people tend to reject
attacks on deeply held views. One way forward, therefore, might be to play on
conceptions on fairness, which hark back to the old British trope of fair play.
In 2018, YouGov found that the vast majority of British people thought that the
early ‘Windrush generation’ of black immigrants had the right to remain here
even if they had not regularised their residency, rejecting the unfairness of the
Home Office policy of seeing them as illegal immigrants. From the bottom-up, we need groups and individuals to
talk more about… how best to live together.
The results of
such conversations will not be rapid, as the top-down approach faces the
problem that many people distrust politicians and experts. But the rise of
national populism helps show what happens when we have democratic ‘leaders’ who
do not seek to educate and point to the way forward on key issues. The
bottom-up approach faces the problem that it can be hard to spot common ground
in an often polarised debate, which pitches those who defend universal equality
and human rights against those who defend the pre-eminence of the national interest
and ‘natives’. But just remember that 85% of British people are ‘balancers’,
and the evidence is that they are open to conversations and democratic compromise
about the best way forward. They are seeking a new
form of democracy where ordinary people’s views count for more.
Contrary to the
claims of many, the vast majority of national populist supporters are not
authoritarians seeking to overthrow democracy, though socially conservative
ideas are common among them. Rather, they are seeking a new form of democracy
where ordinary people’s views count for more.
The fact that
many national populist voters have relatively low levels of education, and are
not greatly interested in politics, does not mean that their views should be
ignored or seen as necessarily a threat to democracy. Rather, national populism
is Janus-faced. It poses dangers in its delegitimisation of mainstream politics
and through its xenophobic side. But it also highlights the need for democratic
renewal. The fact that we need widespread institutional change to achieve this,
like proportional representation and greater local democracy, does not negate
the urgent need to begin a serious conversation about immigration as part of
this renewal.
Boston,Lincolnshire. Wikicommons.Some rights reserved.
