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There was a time when thinking in terms of the
National Security Doctrine was the thing to do, now it's the National
Insecurity Doctrine.
According to this new creed, the enemy today is a network
of interconnected actors who operate domestically as part of a global dark plot
– thus, the military and their firepower are needed to neutralize and eliminate
them. The policy, however, is absolutely wrong.
On May 29th 2018, coinciding with the
Army Day celebrations, Argentine President Mauricio Macri said: "We need
our armed forces to dedicate greater efforts to collaborate with other areas of
the State, providing logistical support to the security forces taking care of
the Argentines in the face of the current threats and challenges".
Almost
two months later, on July 23, Macri insisted on the existence of several 21st
century "challenges and threats" and stressed that this was an
important reason for having the armed forces "collaborate with internal security".
That same day, Decree 683 was published in the Official Gazette. In essence, it
points in the direction of enabling the participation of the military in
matters such as the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism.
I would like, in this context, to focus on the
term "threats" which is being used by the government of Cambiemos to
name a current, transcendental new issue.
What does this use aim at? In what
interpretative matrix can it be placed? How does that expression tie in the
framework of inter-American relations?
In my view, the answer to these
questions requires that we stop first in the United States and examine, as a
starting point, the so-called Grand Strategy and its evolution over time, for
Washington has been adapting and updating its approach.
This can lead us to
recognize both the global level and the continental specificity through which
the US Grand Strategy has been expressed.
The role of the Latin American military was, in terms of Washington's Grand Strategy, primarily that of a home front: fighting and subduing the "internal enemy" – local "Communism", which was understood as an extension of Soviet expansionism in the region.
During the Cold War, in the area of inter-State
relations, Washington deployed a strategy of containment. In that period, it was
essential to stop the expansion of the Soviet Union (USSR) and, if possible, to
reverse both its outward power projection into the periphery (the Third World,
as it was then called) and the assertion of its area of influence (that is,
Eastern Europe).
In the area of non-State relations and, particularly in
peripheral nations, Washington resorted – both directly and indirectly – to
counterinsurgency.
This was a form of confrontation aimed at undermining the
legitimacy of armed opponents (for example, guerrilla groups and national
liberation movements), blocking access to resources so as to prevent them from
carry on fighting, weakening the adversary's political opportunities and
gathering support (for example, in rural areas and urban centers).
The prevailing military doctrine was deterrence.
That is, making it clear to the USSR that the costs of attacking Western Europe
and using nuclear weapons against the United States and its allies would be
exorbitant, because Washington's response would annihilate them.
The dynamics
of "assured mutual destruction" underlied a doctrine which mirrored
the same type of message Moscow was sending to the United States.
This strategy and doctrine were complemented in
the diplomatic field by the establishment of firm political-military alliances.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance and the ANZUS Treaty (Australia, New Zealand and the
United States) were, under the premise of bipolarity, the agreements that
ensured the maintenance of Washington's zones of influence and its
international power projection.
Now, in the Latin American sphere, a subordinate
doctrine was derived from the US Grand Strategy. The eventual final
confrontation between East and West had, as leading actors, the United States
and Western Europe on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, on
the other, while the armed forces of Latin America were not considered decisive
in a hypothetical direct combat with the USSR.
The role of the Latin American
military was, in terms of Washington's Grand Strategy, primarily that of a home
front: fighting and subduing the "internal enemy" – local
"Communism", which was understood as an extension of Soviet
expansionism in the region.
Within this framework, counterinsurgency was the
Armed Forces' main domestic strategy – to be carried out with the support of
the US and, if need be, their involvement. All of this was embedded in a
subordinate doctrine: the National Security Doctrine (NSD).
In the immediate post-Cold War period, contention
was maintained as a strategy both in the face of a potential resurgence of
Russia and China's emerging power.
Deterrence persisted as a doctrine in
relation to State counterparts, while missile responses were used against
non-State actors as retaliation for terrorist attacks against US interests
abroad.
The subordinate logic that has been consolidating itself in most of Latin America within the framework of the redefinition of the Grand Strategy is the logic of the already mentioned "new threats" – multiple, intertwined and lethal.
There were no diplomatic changes regarding the alliance system:
Washington's international behavior followed a pattern which combined episodic
multilateralism and recurrent unilateralism.
As for the subordinate logic, after the collapse
of the Soviet Union and Communism in Eastern Europe, the phenomenon of the
so-called "new threats" (drug trafficking, terrorism, organized
crime, etc.) was devised – primarily by the US.
These new threats were
conceived, in Marcelo Saín's words, as "a set of risks and non-traditional
conflict situations – that is, not generated by interstate conflicts derived
from border-territorial disputes or competition for strategic dominance".
The importance and the impact of the attacks of
September 11, 2001 in the US ushered in a redefinition of the Grand Strategy.
The new strategy was aimed quite simply at military supremacy. That is,
Washington would not (and does not) tolerate, either in the military or the
political field, any equal-size international competitor (peer competitor), be
it its old rival Russia or its new opponent China.
This was not a matter of
good or bad will, or ideology (conservative or liberal), but something derived,
to a large extent, from the obvious imbalance of power in the world system.
The
strategy of primacy assumed (and assumes) that the vital interests of the
United States are not sufficiently protected by a multilateral set of rules and
agreements.
As for the non-State actors, to the famous
traditional counter-insurgency strategy a counter-terrorist one was added,
which consists of attacking militarily any opponent considered to be criminal
and lethal (thus not entitled to political recognition) and deploying a variety
of coercive actions against terrorist groups (preferably Islamic), eventually
their State allies, their material support networks and shelters.
As for doctrine, deterrence continued to be the
backbone of military thinking. At the height of what was presumed to be an
enduring unipolar condition, Washington was on the road to achieving unquestioned
predominance.
A new element incorporated after 9/11 was the "preventive
war" doctrine. Its aim was to show that the US appropriates to itself the
power to use its military might against any country, whether it may be ready to
attack the United States imminently or not, without taking into account any
evidence in order to legitimize, at least partially, its recourse to the
military instrument in international relations.
Likewise, the solid alliances of the past (as
diplomatic instruments of political and military support and commitment)
overlapped in some cases and, in others, were replaced by ad hoc coalitions
(the so-called Coalitions of the Willing), which means that Washington –
Washington only – determines what the mission is and then establishes the
coalition necessary to carry it out (as in Iraq or against the Islamic State).
Finally, the subordinate logic that has been
consolidating itself in most of Latin America within the framework of the
redefinition of the Grand Strategy is the logic of the already mentioned
"new threats" – multiple, intertwined and lethal.
This proliferation
of intersecting dangers is fostered by the absence and/or partial capture of
the State and, consequently, requires that the armed forces take on an active
role to confront them – thus erasing the difference between internal security
and external defence.
This leads to what I call the National Insecurity
Doctrine, which is a substitute for the old security doctrine: current enemies
are a network of interconnected actors who operate in the home front as part of
a global dark plot – and thus, the military and their firepower are needed to
neutralize and eliminate them.
Complementarily, at the international level, the
question now is not to involve the military in the traditional United Nations
peace missions any longer, but rather in anti-terrorist actions within the new
operations being deployed by the UN itself – for example, in some African
countries.
The call by Argentine President Mauricio Macri to involve the military in the fight against "threats and challenges" must be understood in the context of the "new threats" dynamics.
The call by Argentine President Mauricio Macri to involve the military in the fight
against "threats and challenges" must be understood in the context of
the "new threats" dynamics which, in turn, arose from the changes that
have occurred in inter-American relations.
This will not only affect one of the
assets of democratic Argentina in Latin America – namely, the strict separation
between defence and internal security – but also obstruct the urgently needed
national debate on what sort of defence policy and what sort of armed forces
the country needs today.
A large majority of those who believe in the value and
usefulness of that separation have been arguing that such a debate cannot be
postponed and that it must be done using serious, frank and head-on arguments.
But on the contrary, the position of the government of Cambiemos in this matter
leads to less discussion about defence and a further weakening of the Armed
Forces.
This
article is being published as part of the partnership between Nueva Sociedad
and democraciaAbierta. You can read the original here.
