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This article is part of the series "Ellections in Colombia 2018: depolarization and disinformation", developed in partnership with Nueva Sociedad Magazine and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.
Political
polarisation is a phenomenon that implies the amplification of divergent political
attitudes and the consequent displacement of these attitudes towards the
ideological extremes.
In a scenario of this nature, the voices of the centre or
those with moderated views lose their visibility, power and influence.
Occasionally, and when the political parties are strong, this division can
manifest itself as a reinforcement of the extremist sectors within political
parties and/or as an increase in the ideological distance that exists between
them.
This is evident in the case of the US where the so called “middle
Republicans” and the “middle Democrats” have been distancing themselves at
great speed during the past decade.
Many suggest that Colombian politics had never been so hostile in its use of political discourse.
Colombia will choose
a new president this year and the electoral process has put the discussion over
polarisation on the table.
Many suggest that Colombian politics had never been
so hostile in its use of political discourse and that political platforms and
ideological positions had never been so distanced. “We are a country that is
profoundly polarised” is a phrase that has been uttered many times throughout
political discussions.
But is Colombia
really politically polarised? How much of this supposed “new” polarisation is
not what it appears to be? How much of what is perceived as pure “social media
scandal” and full-on discourse is true polarisation? Is a lot of what is
happening during the current elections more a process of diversification and
pluralisation of voices rather than polarisation?
First, it must be
said that it is impossible to respond to these questions with conclusiveness
because in Colombia there are no strict variable measurements that come close
to the phenomenon of polarisation as it has been defined in this text.
There
are surveys, such as the Barometer of the Americas, that measures political
attitudes of the Colombian population and even though they may reach some
conclusions regarding polarisation, they are not designed to measure this
concept.
Additionally, in
the case of the barometer, there are only results available until 2016 and it
would be impossible to make a generalisation regarding the state of
polarisation today with this data.
Finally, yet another factor that complicates
the measuring of polarisation is the profound political party crisis in
Colombia, which makes it hard to view polarisation as a product of party
activity (contrary to what is happening in the US for example).
In fact, at the
beginning of the electoral race, 11 candidates put themselves forward with the
backing of signatures [1] and only two did so with the backing of their political
parties, implying that if there is polarisation, it is possible that this is
down to political and ideological division that does not necessarily overlap
with political party divisions. This further complicates the task of identifying
and measuring the phenomenon.
The result of this
lack of diagnosis is the feeling that intuition can dictate to us if there is a
degree of polarisation, but we do not know how much nor how new it really is,
nor across what boundaries it operates: are we dealing with a polarisation
between liberals and conservatives? Or a classic division between left and
right? Or is it a combination of both?
16.5% of the Colombian population define themselves as left-leaning, but are against marriage between couples of the same sex.
In the case of the
left-right division, the panorama is slightly clearer thanks to one of the
questions of the Barometer of the Americas that consulted Colombians over where
they sit on a scale of 1 (extreme left) and 10 (extreme right). Historic
evolution provides the following results:
Those who identify
as left-leaning have increased in numbers, and those who identify as
right-leaning have decreased. Additionally, those who identify with the centre
have increased although this has been small.
The definition of polarisation
proposed at the beginning of this text suggests that when polarisation
intensifies, the centre becomes reduced and this has not happened in Colombia,
at least up until 2016. Only from this data can it be suggested that
polarisation is not quite what it seems.
Another interesting
observation from the Barometer is that the left-right spectrum does not appear
to correspond to social issues or issues of principle that go beyond purely
political matters. For example, 16.5% of the Colombian population define
themselves as left-leaning, but are against marriage between couples of the
same sex.
Something similar occurs with issues such as euthanasia, drug
consumption and divorce. Thus, the amount of Colombians who identify with the
left may have increased, however that does not imply a greater level of
polarisation inasmuch as political differences are still concentrated in
concrete issues and do not overlap with social issues as such.
That said, it is
possible to speculate that this phenomenon owes itself to the arrival of
political figures from the Democratic Centre’s campaign (right-wing political
party led by ex-president Álvaro Uribe and whose candidate for the presidential
race is Iván Duque) with a strong religious stance like Viviane Morales
(representative of the Evangelical church) and ex-prosecutor Alejandro Ordoñez
(subscriber to one of the most conservative branches of Catholicism).
But, it
is still early to know whether this increased religious component among the
right will produce increased levels of polarisation.
However, we know very
little about any other kind of division out with what is considered as
polarisation. It is difficult to know if we are dealing with a disagreement
between liberals and conservatives in a broad sense.
In Colombia, the
traditional parties were the Liberals and the Conservatives and this can
generate confusion and noise when those who conduct surveys opt for asking
people whether they consider themselves as politically “liberal” or “conservative”,
as this has little to do with these parties today. Thus, it is not often you
will find surveys that investigate this type of affiliation.
Another indicator
which could give an indication regarding the intensification of polarisation in
Colombia is the growth in antipathy towards the contenders, or in other words,
the measure in which unfavourable opinions have grown towards others from the
other side of the political spectrum.
Although I am unaware of any attempt to
measure this indicator through surveys, I believe the dynamics of the Colombian
political conversation would suggest that it is in this arena in which
political polarisation is most evident.
Dangerously enough,
mentions of the political contenders also refer to the dynamics of the armed
conflict of Colombia: on one hand, the right is classified as the “paramilitaries”
and on the other, the left is classified as the “guerrilla”. For the right, the
centre is tepid and indecisive, and for the left, it is seen as a closeted
right-wing movement.
The right is classified as the “paramilitaries” and the left is classified as the “guerrilla”. For the right, the centre is tepid and indecisive, and for the left, it is seen as a closeted right-wing movement.
In such a political
context, it is hardly difficult to explain the problems the centre candidates
(Sergio Fajardo and Humberto de la Calle) have been having in constructing and spreading
a concrete and consistent message, and in consolidating themselves as the
favourites in the current electoral race.
While there is
another part of this conversation that is far from the previously described
extreme postures, the impression I have is that this tends to become suffocated
among the shouts and the accusations from one side and another.
In other words,
the debate that takes place between politicians, analysts and even citizens
active on social networks tends to oscillate easily between the extremes. For
these very reasons, the spectrum of discussion of the political centre is
probably where political polarisation is most felt.
We must also ask
ourselves if it is the individuals (politicians and their supporters) of the
extremes that make a bigger effort for their voices to be heard. In the same
vein, we must also ask ourselves if the centre is not smaller or less powerful,
but simply less vocal.
Once again, there is little information regarding this
issue but a quick look at behaviour on social networking platforms in Colombia
would corroborate this thesis that the sensation of a polarised discussion has
increased, even though the final electoral results may indicate something
entirely different.
It would also be
interesting to observe in what measure these so called “ideological silos” have
grown and become generalised. In other words, in what measure de facto segregation
is occurring, that then leads Colombians to isolate themselves in particular spaces
where only the same political opinions are shared.
This indicator attempts to
measure partially that we are tolerant to the opinions of others depending on the
level with which we chose to surround ourselves with those who think the
differently.
Inasmuch as there are not yet clusters of coherent and broad
issues beyond the two ends of the political spectrum, it is possible that these
ideological silos have not yet been consolidated in Colombia with the same strength
that they have been in the US.
It is possible that
these ideological silos have not yet been consolidated in Colombia with the same
strength that they have been in the US.
Possible
explanations
Thus, if we suppose
that in spite of the shortage of data regarding political attitudes we can
trust intuition that results from following political debate and affirms we
find ourselves before an atypical and polarised campaign, the obvious question
would be: What has provoked this change? Why do find ourselves in such a
scenario today?
I will take the
risk of elaborating various hypotheses for such discussion, two of which are
intimately connected to the recent peace process that culminated in the end of
the armed conflict between the FARC and the Colombian state.
The first argument
is that the peace process produced a counterintuitive effect: instead of
uniting Colombian society around a common objective, it served only to
profoundly divide in an almost irreconcilable way.
The most eloquent manifestation
of this division is the result of the 2017 referendum that asked Colombians
after the Havana negotiations had ended if they supported the final agreement
to terminate the conflict and construct a firm and lasting peace. The turnout
was 37.43%, and 49.78% voted yes while 50.21% voted no.
In effect, since
2012 (year in which the negotiations began) and until today, the political
discussion has been monopolised by this topic and by the divisions that it
generates. Even the candidates for the current presidential elections can be
differentiated mostly by their level of support or their questioning of the
peace agreements.
Since 2012 and until today, the political discussion has
been monopolised by the peace process and by the divisions that it generates.
My second argument
suggests that we may be confusing polarisation with a phenomenon that appears
similar but is also very different. I suggest that the end of the war with the
FARC, a revolutionary Marxist guerrilla, opened up the political space for the
left that had been politically locked away in the past and has now increased
the political ideological spectrum within which Colombian electoral politics
functions.
One of the
strategies of the traditional political classes to marginalise and crush social
movements and the left was to systematically suggest that they had links to the
armed guerrilla movements.
This did not just put the left at constant risk
whilst forcing them to quietly militate, but it also delegitimised it before
the Colombian public. This facilitated Colombian electoral politics as a centre
and right-wing domain, in which electoral competency was restricted and deep-rooted
differences were seldom exposed.
The current
electoral race broke up the centre-right consensus that dominated the country with
one swift blow and has ranked left-wing candidate Gustavo Petro as the second
favourite in most surveys up until this point. The left, in a short space of
time, went from the minority to the mainstream.
This has implied a transformation of the
political debate and has forced the traditional political classes to deal with
new issues with substantial dissent. To put it in other words, the discourse
nowadays is more diverse, the ideological continuum has been increased and it
has incorporated positions that had been less visible in past electoral
campaigns.
The reaction of the traditional politicians before such a change,
whilst they adapt, may be more visceral and less proactive (after all, they do
not underestimate the “threat” that the left can win) and this could be the
cause of a more belligerent and at times violent political discussion.
Political positions
therefore appear more distanced from one another but that may be a result of
the diversification and pluralisation of the Colombian political system. If
this is the case, this can only be good news and what Colombians today
understand as polarisation could be a mere mirage.
It is more like we
are before a process of consolidation and strengthening of our democracy, a perfectly
predictable effect upon ending an armed conflict.
To finish, two
additional factors must be considered: to start with, in Colombia, the social
agenda is increasingly merging with the political agenda. Issues such as LGBTI
rights, women’s rights (such as abortion), drug consumption etc., tend to be
discussed more.
When faced with such a scenario, the conservative consensus
that surrounds these issues has begun to break down. It is possible in this
context that these issues are settling in clusters alongside political issues,
thus feeding into future polarisation.
Here, intermediate or moderated
political perspectives are difficult to design, going against the centre and
reducing its strength.
Secondly, social
networks are not the cause of political polarisation, but they certainly
facilitate it. And in Colombia, this condition is accentuated because media
outlets that seek to balance social networks and contribute to civilised and
fair political debate are scarce.
On occasions, the low level of credibility of
national media outlets has led them to reproduce the battles fought on social
networks to increase their ratings.
If we add to all
this the fact that extreme political discourse is easier to present than that
of the centre, and that it provokes emotions that electorally influence people,
we have been led into a context in which political conversation fails to abide
by the basic rules of courtesy.
The big question is whether the undesirable
conditions of the Colombian electoral discussion equate to an unusual strengthening
of polarisation and of how substantive differences that are drowning out
moderate and pragmatic voices are managed.
The question remains unanswered to
this day because the clues as to why are only as numerous as the incomplete
information at our disposal.
___________
[1] According to
Law 130 of 1994, groups of citizens can apply to run in the presidential
elections if they can receive signatures equivalent to at least 20% of the
result of dividing the electoral potential by the number of seats of the
respective constituency. In no case will more than 50,000 signatures be
demanded. In 2005, this threshold was modified in the light of the presidential
elections and a minimum number of signatures equivalent to 3% of the total of
all valid votes cast from the previous election was put in place.
