Trump – Womens March on 21 January,2017. Wikicommons/ Mark Dixon. Some rights reserved.Typically, security
research is called upon to give advice on how to sort things out when there
is something wrong.
9/11 was the
watershed and since then the security industry’s R&D-Ghostbusters have been
busy determining who the ghosts are and what gadgets and policies are needed to
save and protect human lives from imminent threats.
Like the ghosts in
the movie these threats become visible and tangible only through the use of sophisticated
high-tech equipment that must be handled by professional security experts. Scanners,
sensors, surveillance wet-, soft- and hardware are offered for sale to public
authorities and their private contractors on flourishing security markets.
As long as the
chase for ghosts goes on chances are good that at least one of the five key
objectives of the European security research programme will be achieved: the
establishment of a “Competitive European Security Industry”.
Techno-solutionism
Policy- or
mission-oriented research in the field of security is confronted with a non-negotiable
a-priori: there is a security
problem! Hence, the focus of research is on finding a solution to a problem.
What exactly the
problem is, however, remains unquestioned. This has created an approach that
critical observers have labelled techno-solutionism. We do not exactly know what
the problem is, but we assume technology will provide a solution. At the
research end of the equation this techno-solutionism has created a strong bias
towards technology and engineering efforts: here is the problem, go find a technical
solution!
A closer look at
the problem of problematizing, though, is missing. How threatening are the
threats – this question is out of scope for the European (and most national)
security research programmes. At the policy end, no awkward question will be
asked, since the evil forces are the evil forces and all efforts are directed
to combat them – terrorism, organised crime, illegal migration, cyber
criminals. The focus of research is on finding a solution
to a problem. What
exactly the problem is, however, remains unquestioned.
What are the
reasons for this shortcut that creates a blind spot or no-go area for research,
preventing a close scrutiny of the presumed security problems in their wider
context before embarking on the search for technology-based solutions? Policy
actors, security professionals and the R&D division of the
security-industrial complex (aka military-industrial complex during the Cold
War era) need the “security ghosts” to pursue their strategies.
As critical policy
analysis has recurrently demonstrated, a securitizing policy strategy and governing
through crime and fear are perfect ways to curtail any discussions about wider
societal problems of social justice, global economic exploitation, or environmental
issues etc. A policy approach that, for example, defines the flow of refugees
from the Global South across the Mediterranean primarily as a problem of better
border controls to prevent the influx of Islamist terrorists to mainland Europe
has successfully managed to ignore the wider context of this problem.
Awkward questions
about the impact of European policies on global migration triggered off by
violent conflicts, environmental degradation and neo-imperialist economic
policies will not be asked, when the focus is put on seemingly proximate
“terrorist threats” and illegal immigration.
Look again: where is the threat?
However, where is
the threat? Stripped down to brute figures and body count, over hundred
thousand Europeans fall prey to medical malpractice and die from iatrogenic
disease each year, air pollution produces a similarly high death toll among
European citizens and the chance of becoming a victim of a deadly assault by
your spouse, though very small, is still significantly higher than being
stabbed by a terrorist’s knife.
Such figures could
help to defuse the security hype, they could trigger a debate on what kinds of
threats Europeans should be aware of and which security problems they should address,
how public money should be spent and where urgent political action is required.
But this debate is
missing.
Policy actors and
security professionals sharing control over the hegemonic security discourse
realign fears and channel public arousal towards their convenient enemies. The
members of the law enforcement and intelligence community have a dual role in
this setting: they are on the one hand the legitimate experts institutionally
endowed to speak about and define security threats. Threat levels have to be
kept high to maintain the role of the security professionals and boost further
investment in security technology.
On the other hand,
they are the beneficiaries of security investments and policies. This puts them
into a paradoxical situation. If they were successful in curbing the security
threats, it could weaken their position: mission accomplished, no further urgent
action needed. Hence, threat levels have to be kept high to maintain the role
of the security professionals and boost further investment in security
technology.
This raises the
question of the security-industrial complex. During the Cold war era under the
bipolar world order, defence-related industries generated substantial profits
from continuous public investments in upgrading military technology. Over the
last decades public spending has shifted from military to civil security.
Innovation and investment cycles in military R&D presumably span over a
longer period and so the big corporate players in this field simply attached a
civil label to their products, selling them as either dual use or suitable for
civil security purposes. To keep this business model alive, the convenient security
problems have to be well advertised.
Rare voices, no nonsense and no magic bullets
Security research
extending its scope beyond the narrow techno-solutionist focus could provide
policy makers and the general public with a number of sobering insights. It
could add complexity to the debate and provide evidence-based arguments for a
comprehensive policy approach reaching beyond the presently pursued
more-of-the-same strategy.
A critical
evaluation of existing approaches could challenge the claims of technology- and
surveillance-based security solutions, triggering policy debates about
redirecting investments and public spending.
This might help to
balance policies and weigh alternative options more carefully before embarking
on “new and improved” security technologies.
A few researchers
address security issues outside the dominant techno-solutionist frame, looking
beyond the dominant policy agenda. However, these voices are rarely heard. Of
course, scholars and researchers in critical security studies are offered their
slots in policy hearings, they take the floor in committees and meetings where
the European Security Agenda is discussed.
Their input though,
typically, has the status of interesting after dinner talks, given by invited
speakers to cheer up the audience after long hours of serious business. Raising
their fingers and pointing to (unintended) side-effects of pervasive
surveillance and increasing securitization, these critical experts may send a
shiver down the spine of one or the other policy maker, triggering second
thoughts about what business as usual in security policy could lead to. But
this critical discourse does not affect the security policy agenda shaped by adherents
of a self-declared no-nonsense policy approach.
The reasons for
this are obvious: any serious critical analysis of the present security
landscape will refrain from offering magic bullets to solve a problem. After a
spectacular terrorist attack, there is no similarly spectacular serious policy
response. After decades, if not centuries of imperialist policies, shaping the
Global South, there is no miraculous formula stopping global migration towards
“our” wealthy northern countries. But since the ensuing security problems seem
to be popping up quite unexpectedly, there is a demand for immediate, effective
solutions and counteraction, so policy makers are yearning for magic bullet
type solutions. Opting for a “solution” taking
effect beyond the next election date would be irrational for every politician
or member of a parliamentary assembly, who wants to be re-elected.
Also, the timescale
of parliamentary elections is not compatible with the scope and pace of modern
security threats. While research might offer ideas and comprehensive strategies
for medium and long term approaches to present-day security problems, opting
for a “solution” taking effect beyond the next election date would be irrational
for every politician or member of a parliamentary assembly, who wants to be
re-elected.
Breaking news
Many problems of
contemporary global society are beyond the reach of direct political governance.
Security problems sometimes can be presented, at least on political platforms,
as being within the scope of policy solutions. But any serious policy approach
to these problems would require a thorough understanding and discussion of complex
and interrelated networks of causation and effects.
The limitations of
political debate imposed by the logic of sensationalist media, offering slots
of less than 90 seconds to explain world events as breaking news, runs counter
to any thorough deliberation of contemporary security problems.
And last not least,
the policy actors in charge of taking far-reaching decisions on security issues
themselves rarely have immersed into the complexity of the issues they have to
vote on. They rely on the expertise and advise offered to them, and it has been
demonstrated over the years and across all parliaments of the Western world,
that it is the representatives of the industry and powerful lobby groups who
are able to bring their message across to the politicians. Heterodox experts,
representatives from NGOs, or citizen groups never can activate the PR
resources and manpower big corporations throw into the hegemonic battle over
agenda setting. (Whoever has taken the bus from Brussels Airport and looked at
the corporate labels at the office buildings along the freeway to the city will
get an idea of the range of interests presented to the European policy makers.)
Offering slots of less than 90 seconds to explain
world events as breaking news, runs counter to any thorough deliberation of
contemporary security problems.
Trojan horses and linear pathways
Is there a way out
of this – admittedly somewhat simplified – scenario and the pessimistic
assessment of the role of research in security policy?
It depends. Given
the current situation with powerful lobby groups having taken the security
policy discourse hostage, a re-orientation towards alternative security
narratives will be difficult to achieve. Pointing out negative side effects of
the current policy approach – from privacy and data protection issues to
inefficiency of solutions and waste of resources – may lead to minor realignments.
However, it will hardly change the overall framing of security policy as a
threat-based, techno-fix enterprise of chasing ghosts.
The robustness of
this framing can be studied in one of the recent innovative turns in European
security policy, intended to address the wider root causes of Islamist
terrorism. The establishment of RAN, the European Radicalisation Network
reflects a shift from simple technology-based surveillance towards other
dimensions of security.
The idea was to
bring together, in a more bottom-up fashion, experts across Europe working on
“de-radicalisation” to co-operate and exchange best practices. Approx. 20
million euro were provided to involve local initiatives and communities in looking
at social and cultural factors leading to radicalisation and extremism.
What looks at first
glance like a well-meaning social policy approach to tackle problems of social
injustice, xenophobia and inequality turns out to be a Trojan Horse spreading
surveillance and threat-based screening practices across the community, since
the underlying rationale assumes a linear pathway from radical attitudes to
violent criminal acts of terrorism.
This not only can
turn engaged community activists into the informers of a preventive
surveillance regime but also cuts deep into the rights of freedom of speech and
political engagement. Teachers, social workers, representatives of local Muslim
communities are invited to look for early warning signs and report to the
police, should they encounter a (potential, future, probable) radical
extremist.
However this new
programme will develop in the future, it reveals the fundamental irony of
policy-oriented security research. Emphasising the genuine societal nature and
root causes of social and security problems security research can trigger two
fundamentally different policy responses: either a change of the root cause
conditions or a broadening of the surveillant gaze.
Finally, it
requires a clear political decision opting for either the security of the many
to be protected from the dangerous few, or a commitment for social justice,
respect and equal opportunities for all.
