Former US President Bill Clinton walks from the stage past the casket of former Israeli President Shimon Peres at the memorial service at Mount Herzl national cemetery, Jerusalem, Sept. 30, 2016. Carolyn Kaster/Press Association. All rights reserved. From a historical and
analytical perspective, it may not be very useful to engage the question of
whether Shimon Peres was a ‘man of peace’ or a ‘war criminal’, or both. The
first term ignores the context of his policies (all of which were aimed at
maintaining overall Israeli control), and the second term positions him merely
as one in a long line of Israeli leaders using brutal military force. Neither
term capture what Peres represented historically, and why he stood out,
especially in the later stages of his long career. Let us think of the late Peres (from the early-1990s
onwards) as operating in a new mode of control.
To understand that, let us
think of the late Peres (from the early-1990s onwards) as operating in a new
mode of control, seeking a transition from a strategy of domination to a
strategy of hegemony. What does this mean? Domination is the maintenance of
control through the use of force, or the threat of such use. Hegemony is an
attempt to maintain control through generating consent. How do rulers gain the
consent of the governed? Not by repression, manipulation or brain-washing only
or primarily, but through making some concessions (partly symbolic, partly
material), co-opting elites, incorporating popular elements into the structure
of power in a subordinate position.
For consent to become a real
possibility, it must include willingness on the part of rulers to go some way
towards meeting the concerns of those over whom they exercise control.
Historically, the move from
direct colonial domination to neo-colonial rule in the aftermath of the Second
World War represented such a transition. So did the formation of the European
welfare state. Later on in South Africa, the demise of political apartheid,
which has gone along largely with the retention of social or class apartheid,
can be seen as a move in that direction.
Using this analytical
framework, the Oslo process can be seen as a quest for a hegemonic solution for
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It allowed Israel to retain overall supremacy
but made limited though real symbolic and material concessions to the
Palestinian national cause. Initially, it left several options open – that is,
it was not doomed to failure from the start even if that was the eventual
outcome – but those options closed off fairly quickly with the rise of Hamas,
the assassination of Rabin and an Israeli mental retreat into the security
‘laager’: a return to the military domination paradigm which uses force as the
primary, perhaps the preferred, mechanism of control. A hegemonic solution … initially left several options
open – that is, it was not doomed to failure from the start.
Why did that happen? Two
factors, reinforcing one another, can provide an explanation:
(1) The
concessions required for a hegemonic solution proved too much for the messianic
religious-nationalist Israeli right wing, a minority that was strong enough to
block further progress, and
(2) The
concessions offered by Israel proved too little for radical Palestinian
nationalists, also a minority that was strong enough to block or at least delay
further progress.
This combination created a
deadlocked situation, which needed to be broken if the process was to move
forward. A decisive move against settlers and their supporters in the aftermath
of the Goldstein massacre in Hebron early in 1994, or after Rabin's
assassination late in 1995, could have shifted that balance. But both Rabin (in
1994) and Peres (in 1995-96) recoiled from taking such a step. Thus, they
destroyed the chances of a hegemonic outcome and laid the ground for a return
to domination. Why did they fail to proceed differently?
Faced with the choice between
the prospect of a certain and irrevocable rift within Israeli society if they
moved against settlers, and uncertain historical re-alignment with the
mainstream Palestinian forces as the potential reward, they fell back onto the
safe and familiar ground of resort to the use of force.
Although they did retain the
discourse of reconciliation, peace and compromise, it was emptied of
substantive content. Continued negotiations while settlements remained in place
and settlers remained armed, funded and protected (legally and militarily) by
the state, was a clear indication that Israeli leadership was not ready to do
what was necessary to break the deadlock. Internal Jewish unity was seen as
more important than reaching agreement with the Palestinian leadership. Internal Jewish unity was seen as more
important than reaching agreement with the Palestinian leadership.
If that was the case when
Peres was still in power, the prospect of hegemony became even more remote
during the subsequent reign of Netanyahu. Ehud Barak during his brief interlude
in power (1999-2001), fell prey to the same dynamics that deterred Rabin and
Peres: unwillingness to make decisive moves that might have jeopardised
internal Jewish unity. Whatever concessions he was willing to make were never
enough to satisfy the minimum demands of the Palestinian national movement.
When he was replaced by Sharon, even that limited prospect of a hegemonic
solution was laid to rest.
The Peres project continued
through his relentless personal efforts, but it was running on empty, going
nowhere and increasingly serving only as a fig leaf for ongoing and even
reinforced Israeli domination. Paradoxically, the more celebrated Peres became
and the more support his vision gained overseas, the less influential it became
within the Israeli-Jewish public. The outpouring of grief following his
departure, represents global recognition that without the cover provided by
Peres (and a few intellectuals operating in a similar vein, like Amos Oz), all
we are left with is unmasked Israeli domination, with little chance of being
overturned from within.
Shimon Peres, 28 January 2001. Wikicommons/World Economic Summit. Some rights reserved.
