Not just trappings: tribal affiliations still matter in Libya. Demotix / Ibrahem Azaga. All rights reserved.More than three years since the fall of Muammar Qaddafi,
Libya has plunged into political and security turmoil.
Divisions have deepened among the ever-proliferating
groups, interests and ideologies. The country has two governments and a
plethora of militias control various pockets of territory. Most of the major
cities are subjected to devastating violence. Civilian casualties are rising,
with reports of incidents regularly counting the fatalities in scores. And the
uncontrolled situation is increasingly threatening the stability of
neighbouring countries, as last week’s attack on the Bardo museum in Tunis indicates.
It was not supposed to be like this. When NATO
forces arrived in 2011, they thought Libya would be “the most beautiful of the
Arab Spring”, as one of the EU diplomats following in their train put it. They
believed that with 6m inhabitants, all Sunni Muslims, it would not be difficult
to knit things together. They soon realised, however, that underneath the
seemingly homogeneous Libyan identity lay a rather heterogeneous population,
made up of countless tribes—which the intervention unwittingly ensured acquired
well-armed militias.
Centralised
Following the country’s independence in 1951,
Libya, then a monarchy, was a federation of three regional entities, Tripolitania,
Cyrenaica and Fezzan. These provinces already existed under the Ottoman empire
(1299-1922) and remained as such under Italian domination (1911-43) and Franco-British
occupation (1943-51). But King Idriss, from Cyrenaica, wanted to control the entire
territory under a centralised political system and he transformed the federal
monarchy into a unified national state in 1963. Following his coup in 1969,
Qaddafi pursued the same policy.
A profound cleavage persists between the urban
and rural populations, some of whom have moved into the major Libyan cities.
Rural roots are predominantly Bedouin, stemming from the centre and south of
Libya, and these still tend to prevail over an urban identity. Qaddafi knew only
too well that individuals would be loyal to their tribe before any central
government. One of the reasons he managed to remain in power for more than 40
years was his shrewd manipulation of the tribes, relying on the rural Bedouin in
his power struggles with the big cities.
Libyans have little, if any, experience of
democratic political culture. This lack of political aspiration is substituted
by the personal ambition and über-ego of many politicians and militia
chiefs, more interested in their own success than the fate of the nation. Social
mistrust is the other side of this coin: Misrata, for instance, employs an
estimated 1,300 policemen and 700 secret agents, all from the city—no Libyan
from outside will be employed there.
Militia groups refuse to lay down their arms
unless other militias do so first; the formation of a national army is ruled
out unless it is controlled by (one’s own) militia. And militiamen are often
well-paid by Libyan standards—between $500 and $1,500 a month—which can only
motivate them to sustain the chaotic status
quo. So fighting between these uncontrolled militias, competing for power
in Tripoli and other major cities, has become the norm. Militias often work
hand-in-hand with politicians they protect, some even taking charge of the
security of embassies and diplomats.
Talks
The use of force against the transnational scourge of non-state violence, threatening
the security of Libya and its neighbours, may be
legitimate and necessary. But only an intra-Libyan dialogue can resolve its
deep-rooted conundrums and, in so doing, preserve territorial unity and sovereignty and social
cohesion. This has to be long-term and strategic: it will take
great patience, wisdom and political manoeuvring for Libyans not to see their
country transformed into a giant, upended jigsaw plunging the entire region
into chaos. All the political and military protagonists must engage in genuine
dialogue, finding a lasting solution which prioritises the well-being of the
population.
Yet Libyans have no real political experience
and have still to learn the skills of living in a pluralistic political
culture. To help them reach a national agreement, a co-ordinated regional
approach is required, drawing on states and peoples fully accustomed with the
internal dynamics of Libyan society, culture and language, supported by the
African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN). Neighbours know all too well Libya
and Libyans, and could therefore have a better chance of bringing together the
different protagonists around a negotiating table, which could put an end to
the current, two-governments quagmire.
In this context, multiplication of international
and regional initiatives—the ‘Dakar International Forum on Peace and Security
in Africa’, held last December in Senegal, for instance—can only complicate an
already complex internal situation. Too many initiatives may in the end only duplicate the already
numerous continental efforts led by the AU.
Last’s week carnage in Tunisia, perpetrated by
Tunisian nationals allegedly trained in camps in Libya, reminds us that Libya
has not only become a hub of international violence. Its overspill having already
scarred Mali, it is on the verge of creating transnational chaos right across north
Africa and the Sahel.
