Nicola Sturgeon after the SNP won its third victory in Scottish Parliament elections, 2016. Andrew Milligan / Press Association. All rights reserved. In the immediate aftermath of last week’s elections to the
Scottish Parliament, some London commentators had strong but contrasting
opinions on what the results mean for the chances of a second independence
referendum in Scotland if the UK votes for Brexit on June 23.
In the Financial Times,
Philip Stephens wrote:
““In the event of a Leave vote….Scotland’s SNP would have the platform from
which to secure another referendum on independence. Few doubt that second time
around the nationalists would win.”
Meanwhile, Iain Martin opined
for his CapX blog entitled ‘Ruth Davidson triumph kills off Indyref II’ that, “A
second independence referendum is off the agenda for the foreseeable future, no
matter what happens in the EU referendum.”
In the Scottish media, a much wider range of views were apparent
– not least discussing the implications of the fact that while, with 6 Greens
MSPs as well as 63 SNP MSPs, there is a majority for independence in the
Scottish Parliament, yet for the Greens a second independence referendum — or
Indyref2 — is not a top priority.
For now, when there may be an Indyref2, let alone whether
there will be one if the UK votes for Brexit is an open question — but one that
will cause big political debates if the UK does opt to leave the EU.
Brexit and Indyref2 –
an open question
In many ways, last week’s election results change little —
there was already a diverse set of views amongst pro-independence supporters on
when would be the best timing for a second independence referendum. Nicola
Sturgeon herself set the bar high in saying she wanted to see a substantial and
sustained shift of opinion — in the order of a 60:40% split ‘yes’ to ‘no’ for
independence before calling a second referendum.
Yet Sturgeon also has repeatedly said that a material change
in circumstances, such as Brexit, would potentially be a strong trigger for
Indyref2.
Many others have suggested a target of 2021 would be a good
time for Indyref2 — especially if the Tories had got into government again in
the UK in 2020 — and allowing time to build up a stronger case for
independence. In this approach, ‘no’ voters need to be persuaded by clearer,
and some new, arguments on Scotland having its own currency, on pensions, and
on the economy (especially as oil prices stay low).
For now, opinion polls are not much help. Scottish voters
have been consistently pro-EU in polls over the last year — with a recent Panelbase/Sunday
Times poll putting support for ‘Remain’ at 63% to 37% for “Leave”. In
the face of Brexit, Panelbase found
support for independence would go up from 47% to 52%.
But while a five percentage point increase is not
insubstantial, 52% to 48% support for independence is not the sort of majority
Sturgeon and the SNP are looking for before launching a second independence
referendum. Nor would they have much backing from the wider independence
movement at that point.
One thing many do agree on, on the pro-independence side, is
that whenever a second referendum is held, if it’s lost, then there won’t be
another for several decades. So the decision to go for Indyref2 is a big one
and it has to be got right.
Brexit will be a
shock
Yet if on 23 June, the UK votes for Brexit, this will be a
huge political
shock, both in Scotland and across the UK.
A vote for Brexit is likely to be in the face of votes to
remain in both Scotland and Northern Ireland, and possibly also in Wales
(though the 7 UKIP seats in the Welsh Assembly after last week’s elections
point to sizeable eurosceptic support in Wales). A Brexit vote will spark off a
major political and constitutional crisis across the UK — of which Scotland would
be a very important part but not the only part.
Faced with the reality of English voters dragging Scotland
and Northern Ireland out of the EU, creating outrage in those two parts of the
UK, and creating a wider political crisis across the UK, with immediate economic
effects probably including a falling pound and higher interest rates, not to
mention resignation of the Prime Minister, Scottish voters may well think again
about independence.
Sturgeon and the SNP will surely talk up the constitutional
outrage of Brexit being imposed on them — and a rapid appearance in Brussels,
Scotland becoming the good guys for the EU not England, can be expected.
If support for independence shifts more than the polls
currently suggest, in the face of the grim reality of Brexit — say to a gap of
10% — then many may be tempted to go for a rapid Indyref2.
It will even so be a difficult call. If England leaves the
EU, and Scotland bids to stay by going independent, the Scotland-England border
will be the external border of the EU — and Scotland’s main trading partner
(England) may well be in a different trading regime. Persuading former ‘no’
voters to stick with a shift to ‘yes’, once the immediate emotional aftermath
of a Brexit vote dies down, may be tricky.
The SNP will anyway not need to call an immediate
referendum. Whoever is UK Prime Minister will have to decide when to formally
submit the Brexit request to Brussels. Only then will the two year negotiation
clock start ticking — as set out in the EU’s Lisbon Treaty. And this period can
be extended by the other 27 EU member states.
There may be some political pressure on the SNP to wait and
see what sort of deal the UK negotiates with the EU, before it goes for
Indyref2. Yet if Scotland waited till a full deal was done, it would find
itself outside the EU at that point along with the rest of the UK.
It would also be much more straightforward for an
independent Scotland to stay in the EU, as a new member state that already
meets all EU legislation – after some tough negotiations over the euro,
Schengen and justice and home affairs opt-ins.
If Scotland instead goes along with the rest of the UK in Brexit
— and in the long, complex and time-consuming procedure of repealing or
amending existing EU legislation encompassed in Scottish laws — then Scotland
would have, on independence, to submit a new request to rejoin the EU. This
would trigger a full, formal accession process that could take several years.
There is an intermediate path that the SNP may well take,
while it charts a path ahead in the face of Brexit. Although EU policy is not
devolved, the need to respect EU laws is in the Scotland Act — changing that
could require a so-called ‘legislative consent motion’ which the Scottish
Parliament may not vote for. Likewise, the Scottish Parliament could block and
hinder and stall on repealing or amending EU legislation. Such a blocking
strategy would create a huge political crisis between Holyrood and Westminster.
How long the SNP — with perhaps the Greens and even a few
Labour MSPs — would sustain such a political crisis and blocking strategy is an
open question. So too is the effect over time on the views of the Scottish
public on Indyref2.
Brexit is a much more likely possibility than many had hoped
for at this stage in the campaign. The UK-wide “poll of polls”
from NatCen currently suggests the race is tied at 50:50.
And predicting the impact of Brexit on Scotland — and the
chances of a rapid Indyref2 — is a much more open question than some imagine.
