A road in Hargeisa. Photo: Hala Alkarib.Since 9/11, western countries have increasingly
invested in programmes to prevent transnational violent extremism. These
include serious militarised measures but also “softer” civic interventions under
the banner of ‘countering violent extremism’ (CVE). An example is funding social
development programmes, implemented by civil society, with the aim of engaging
and deterring individuals and communities from “radicalisation”.
An effective response to militant Islamist violence, threats, and underlying
ideologies, is extremely important. But in
the Horn of Africa, CVE programmes have failed to adequately engage
with root causes of religious extremism.
In some cases they have failed so
miserably that we must ask: to what extent are they actually genuine efforts to
address violence and militancy? Are they merely superficial gestures? And how did such a complex issue become the additional burden
of NGOs already struggling with layers of political
and legal restrictions and limited capacity?
Displaced women in Somaliland. Photo: Hala Alkarib.“The flame only burns those who
touch it” is a Sudanese saying that resonates today. Religious militancy is not
a new phenomenon in the Horn of Africa. People have lived through this fire for
the past 30 years. In Somalia,
thousands have been killed as a result of the brutal Al Shabaab insurgency
which has lured Muslim youth towards militancy by exploiting community
vulnerabilities including poverty.
In this region, religious
militancy often disguises itself as an ideology for resistance against state
corruption, ethnic and cultural biases. Meanwhile, counter-terror programmes often
ally themselves with the same corrupt regimes. The west considers Sudan, for instance, a collaborative
partner – though it is itself an incubator of religious militancy as a
result of repressive policies and laws.
Indeed, CVE programming has fallen
far short of the mark – conceptually and in implementation. Even the language used
is deeply problematic. Measures to prevent violent extremism
is vague and ambiguous.
CVE
programmes are clearly supposed to be ‘soft power’ projects in parallel to
military counter-terror interventions. But: what exactly do they mean by
“violent extremism”? Is extremism acceptable if it is not violent? At what
measureable point does an ideology become ‘extreme’? What countermeasures are
acceptable?
And: Are
these projects specifically focused on Islamic religious militancy, or violence
based on other religions and ideologies as well?
Religious militancy often disguises itself as an ideology for resistance against state corruption, ethnic and cultural biases.
These programmes have also been
overly simplistic, largely ignoring driving factors of militancy and violence
including injustices inflicted upon the region’s population. The – largely flawed – operating
assumption is that providing grants to NGOs to undertake development-style
programming will lead to a shift in communities’ social identities, or erase
those inequalities and injustices.
Last
year, the International Organisation for Migration launched a call for
proposals on CVE stating that it intended to provide “small and quick impact support that capitalises on community driven
interventions aimed at mitigating risk factors that contribute towards violent
extremism. These will be preceded by interactive and participatory community
consultations.”
But how
can we think that transforming and influencing social and cultural identity can
be accomplished through “small and quick impact support”?
Since
the First World War, British and French colonial governments, and later the US
government, helped cement political Islam and its organisations as buffers
against Soviet Union’s expansion and to counter socialism’s influences in their
quest for absolute control over Middle Eastern oil and gas.
Today states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran stress that Islam has only specific
veiled versions, of which they are the vanguards. Supposedly, Muslims all over
the world must be either Shia like in Iran or Sunni Salafi like in Saudi
Arabia.
The Islamic faith also has a rich heritage of reform and transformative discourse.
But,
like other religions Islam is very diverse. Peoples’ experiences with it vary
based on their specific historical and cultural contexts and perceptions. The
Islamic faith also has a rich heritage of reform and transformative discourse,
which can be used to facilitate persuasive transition in communities using
their own religious guidance.
The Horn of Africa – which
includes Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia,
Ethiopia and Djibouti – is close to the Arab Gulf region and thus it has
been largely influenced by Salafi religious militancy ideology.
Here, the challenging religious
context is further compounded by the complexity of social identity. Universal
citizenship is not affirmed or applied by all states, to the disadvantage of
minorities. Often, ethnic and religious affiliations also shape identity – as
well as access to resources and services.
I recently heard the story of a
donor-funded CVE project in the coastal areas of Kenya, which shows what’s at
stake when NGOs, following donor agenda, forget that social and cultural change requires great effort, knowledge, and community
ownership.
This project had proposed removing all references to jihad in the Qur’an in Islamic religion
classes for “Madrassa” children – provoking anger and revolt from the
local community over the presumption
that it could intervene in matters of religious identity like this, amending
and censoring materials.
Pursuing social transformation requires focusing on, and investing in, civil movements from within.
Years of experience challenging religious
militancy and its impact on women has taught me that pursuing any form of
social transformation requires focusing on, and investing in, civil movements
from within. It is
the role of people living in regions where militant Islam is rife to lead and
decide on the best approach to countering it.
Trying
to address injustices suffered under militant Islamists requires meticulous and
tireless work – but it is one of the most effective approaches.
Women’s
movements have also been negotiating and challenging discrimination within
different sects of Islamic traditions, text and jurisprudence. Academic Amina Wadud
has contributed to a feminist reading of Quranic text based on equality and justice
which counter to traditional and militant readings. Addressing religious
militancy’s impacts and drivers is also a core priority of the SIHA Horn of Africa women’s network.
This
approach must be adopted by political parties too and be connected to wider
struggles for democracy, freedom of belief, equality and justice. Unfortunately, most CVE programmes and other counter
terrorism strategies can only be characterised as pursuing ‘quick-fixes’ and
short-sighted and short-term gains.
Communities in the Horn of Africa must look
inside rather than outside for solutions. Within
civil society, we must tackle prohibitions and fear of debate and critical
engagement with Islam. Internationally, we need a new agenda, centred
on liberation, to support movements relevant to the communities most affected
by violent extremism.
