People buy food at a supermarket in Doha, capital of Qatar, on June 6, 2017. Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen joined Saudi Arabia and Egypt in severing relations with gas-rich Qatar, with Riyadh accusing Doha of supporting groups, including some backed by Iran. Picture by Nikku/Xinhua News Agency/PA Images. All rights reserved. The 5th of June decision by Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), and their allies and proxies – Egypt, Bahrain, the
Maldives, Mauritania and rival governments in Libya and Yemen – to
sever
diplomatic and other links with Qatar can be read as
payback for Qatar’s support of the wave of uprisings in the Middle
East and North Africa in 2010-2011. It represents, for KSA and UAE,
another phase in their process since 2011 to reverse the changes
brought about by the uprisings. These had seen the two countries
deploy troops to successfully protect the Bahraini monarch, increase
their aid to Morocco and Jordan –which were at the time
experiencing large protests–, and financially and diplomatically
support the Egyptian military’s ouster of president Mohammed Mursi
in 2013.
The sanctions on Qatar aim to force the government of Tamim bin
Hamad Al Thani to alter its foreign policy – particularly regarding
its warming relations with Iran, and to end its financial and
political support for Islamist dissidents in the region such as the
Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.
The Saudi-led move followed and was encouraged by US President
Donald Trump’s visit to KSA in May, and his 21st of May speech
in Riyadh where he supported stronger action against
Iran, and spoke out against terrorism – including Hamas in his list
of terrorist groups.
Saudi and Emirati claims
The main
reason advanced by KSA and UAE for these harsh
measures such as the land-sea-air embargo and travel prohibition for
citizens of these countries, was a statement attributed to Al Thani,
in which he allegedly praised Iran’s regional role and criticised
states seeking to declare the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) a terrorist
organisation. The 23rd of May statement, published on the website of
the state-owned Qatari News Agency, is likely a hack, as the
Qatari foreign ministry has claimed. No audio or video
footage exists of the emir’s speech, purportedly presented at a
graduation ceremony for National Guard officers at the Al Udeid base.
Although the alleged statement may reflect the broad trajectory of
Qatari foreign policy, Al Thani is unlikely to have expressed such
sentiments publicly. Moreover, statements praising Hezbollah and
criticising the US are at odds with Qatar’s policy and national
interest, especially considering that Qatar supports forces opposing
Hezbollah in Syria, while the US
troops stationed at Al Udeid are critical to Qatar’s
security.
Nevertheless, there are indications of warming relations between
Qatar and Iran, as evidenced by Al Thani’s 27th of May
congratulatory
phone call to Iran’s re-elected president, Hassan
Rouhani, during which he proposed enhancing Qatari-Iranian ties.
Further, reports
that Qatar paid a $1 billion ransom for Qatari royals kidnapped in
Iraq, and that about $700 million ended up with Iran and
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, also enraged the KSA and UAE. This is
especially in a context where it was alleged that the funds secured
Qatar’s foreign minister, Mohammad bin Abdul Rahman Al Thani, a
meeting with the Iranian Quds Force’s Qassim Sulaimani in which
enhanced intelligence cooperation was discussed, even though this is
highly conspiratorial.
For KSA, these moves compromise its battle with Iran for regional
hegemony, especially in a context where Iran is seen as consolidating
control over Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. This has seen the monarch
become extremely paranoid, adopting schizophrenic policy postures,
especially in its willingness to partner with Yemen’s Islah party
in Taiz, yet simultaneously pronounce against participatory Islamists
in Egypt. Riyadh’s actions against Qatar fall into this milieu.
The UAE has conversely used the KSA’s action to pursue its
agenda of trying to force Qatar to cease support for the MB and other
such groups. It has pursued this objective throughout the region,
through financing parties such as Nidaa Tounes in Tunisia, and
militarily supporting the campaigns of Khalifa Haftar in Libya and
Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in Egypt. UAE officials have vocally criticised
the role of participatory Islamists such as the MB and Hamas, and are
reportedly financing the campaign of Mohammed Dahlan to succeed Abu
Mazan as head of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and
Palestinian Authority. Al Thani’s alleged statements merely
provided a pretext for both these countries. This is especially true
since Qatar’s support for civil society action during the 2011
uprisings is incompatible
with Saudi and Emirati regional aims, upsets the
regional balance, and could ultimately threaten their own monarchies.
The sanctions, however, did not happen entirely suddenly and
without careful consideration. In 2014, the KSA and UAE, together
with Bahrain, recalled their ambassadors from Doha in a
successful attempt to weaken Qatari ties with the
Muslim Brotherhood. The current sanctions follow a campaign by,
mainly, the UAE to demonise Qatar, particularly in the USA where, in
a mere two weeks, fourteen
op-eds in US media attacked Qatar and called for the
USA to downgrade relations with that country. The cutting of ties by
Egypt, Yemen, the Maldives, Mauritania, the House of Representatives
in eastern Libya, and the Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi government in Yemen
was primarily in support of their Saudi and Emirati benefactors.
There has been some suspicion in the region that KSA and UAE would
act against Qatar, but the suddenness (and severity) took everyone by
surprise. It is possible that the suddenness is related to a recently
leaked email correspondence of UAE ambassador to Washington, Yousef
al-Otaiba, which reveal his country’s disdain for US-Qatari
relations, anger at the US military base in Qatar, and envy about
Qatar’s hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup. The emails hint at
Otaiba’s role in the anti-Qatar campaign in Washington over the
past few weeks.
To justify
the action, the two countries have accused Qatar of
threatening the region’s stability, through the coverage of its Al
Jazeera media channel. Further, they accuse Doha of ‘adopting’
terrorist organisations – including the Islamic
State group, and supporting
opposition Shi'a groups in Bahrain and eastern Saudi
Arabia. Much of this is untrue, especially in regards to Qatari
support for Shia dissident groupings in Eastern Saudi Arabia, and was
likely a means of deflecting attention away from KSA’s inability to
stifle the currently intensifying protests in the largely Shia
populated cities of Qatif and Dammam. What is true, however, is that
the UAE-KSA and Qatar also support different (even opposing) sides in
Egypt, Libya and Syria, and both countries regard Qatar as an
obstacle to their agenda for the region.
KSA Containment
Following the conclusion of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, Saudi
Arabia has attempted
to contain Iran’s growing influence in the region.
Paranoia has also seen KSA accuse Tehran of supporting Yemen’s
Houthi movement, a factor that saw it launch a large scale aerial
and ground campaign in that country in March 2015. The kingdom has
sought to enhance this containment strategy by advocating unity
amongst ‘Sunni’ states, and by tolerating and sponsoring
Islamists linked to the MB, such as Yemen’s Islah movement. The
December 2015 formation of the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight
Terrorism (IMAFT) can be viewed in this context, especially since
countries such as Turkey, Indonesia and Malaysia, which are viewed as
sympathetic toward and/or being constituted of participatory
Islamists, were invited to join, while countries with a majority Shia
population such as Iraq and Iran were
excluded,
even though Iraq was one of its four designated operational areas,
and despite the fact that both Riyadh and Tehran have been involved
in the fight against IS.
Trump’s singling
out Iran as the greatest regional threat emboldened
KSA, and especially its inexperienced deputy crown prince Mohammad
bin Salman. The Riyadh
declaration, which KSA issued after Trump’s visit,
vociferously admonished Iran’s regional role and advocated a
coordinated containment strategy. However, Qatar was regarded as not
being entirely compliant with KSA’s wish to isolate Iran.
UAE opportunism
The UAE has mainly focused on Qatari support for Islamists such as
Hamas and the MB, which the UAE believes poses a greater threat to it
than Iran. This conformed to Cairo’s position on the MB, and Egypt
thus followed suit with the UAE, the major financial backer of the
state and of the 2013 Egyptian coup.
Abu Dhabi also used the situation to reduce tension between forces
it supports in Yemen and those supported by KSA. Pressure had been
building since June 2016, when the UAE redeployed its frontline
forces to southern Yemen, to consolidate the gains of the
secessionist Southern Movement (Al-Hirak), in opposition to Saudi
interests. Worsening the situation, in February 2017, forces loyal to
the UAE prevented Hadi, heavily supported by KSA, from landing at
Aden’s airport, leading to Riyadh’s having to act as a mediator
in an attempt to enforce Hadi’s ‘prerogative’. There was
likelihood of further deterioration as these
same forces routed those of Hadi and consolidated
control over the Aden airport. At the heart of these differences is
UAE opposition to Saudi support for Yemen’s MB-aligned Islah
movement.
The UAE thus expertly exploited the inexperience of Saudi Arabia’s
thirty-one-year-old deputy crown prince to create a false consensus
around Qatar. Significantly, the suspension of Qatari troops from
Yemen as part of KSA-UAE sanctions will empower UAE-supported groups,
at the expense of Saudi-supported Hadi. Although Qatar’s troop
contingent was minimal (1000 troops), Doha and Riyadh have comparable
interests in Yemen – which are not the same as the UAE’s.
Expansion
In what is definitely a major diplomatic crisis for the Gulf,
other countries are also becoming engaged. Apart from KSA and UAE
allies that cut ties with Qatar, Jordan has also downgraded its
links. Conversely, Iran and Turkey have rallied behind Qatar,
offering to mediate the crisis, and resolving to assist Doha.
The USA, which has its largest military base in the Middle East
stationed in the country, has issued contradictory messages. While
president Trump expressed his support for the move on twitter,
claiming responsibility for its success, the Pentagon expressed its
gratitude for Doha’s continued support –US secretary of state Rex
Tillerson even offered to mediate. It is thus likely that the US will
attempt to ensure the smooth continuation of relations with both Doha
and Riyadh. The Udeid base, which is the seat of America’s Central
Command (CENTCOM), and home to over eleven thousand US troops, is
unlikely to be disbanded, especially in light of the administration’s
renewed focus on Islamist militancy. Further, it is likely that
Trump’s defence secretary James Mattis and national security
advisor Herbit McMaster will act to ensure policy continuity. This
can already be observed from Trump’s now weakened tone on China and
North Korea, which has retreated from its initial bellicose nature,
to one favouring compromise and negotiation. Already two US naval war
vessels have docked
in Qatar, to continue joint training with the Qatari Royal Navy in an
exercise that was likely planned prior to the embargo, while on the
14th of June Qatar concluded a twelve billion dollar deal with the US
for the purchase of F15 aircraft. Significantly, in this regard James
Mattis announced the deal, illustrating that the US defence
department views Udeid as critical, and alluding to a continuation of
US policy in the region.
Looking forward
As in 2014, Kuwait and Oman will attempt to mediate a resolution
to the crisis. Neither has severed ties with Qatar, and Kuwait’s
emir has been shuttling around the Gulf to seek agreement on a
mediation process. Both states maintain good ties with Iran, and Oman
was involved in preliminary negotiations for the nuclear deal in
March 2013, helping to ensure face-to-face talks between Iranian and
American officials prior to the commencement of public negotiations.
However, resolving the dispute this time will be more challenging,
especially since the demands on Qatar are multifaceted, and because
the measures instituted are more wide-ranging than in 2014.
Qatar faces three possible options. First is the unlikely
possibility of it aligning with Iran. Second, it could buckle under
the pressure and give in to KSA-UAE demands, especially since it
depends on Gulf transit routes for its food security, and because of
its strong economic links with Saudi Arabia. Such a capitulation
could mean that members of Hamas and the MB residing in Doha will be
expelled (possibly to Turkey and Lebanon). Further, Qatari media
activities will be severely curtailed, and the Al Jazeera network, in
particular, will have its wings clipped and will begin resembling
other Gulf media outlets. Qatar’s links with Iran will also have to
be firmly cut. The third option is that Qatar remains defiant, and
joins with Turkey to informally form a third (neutral) axis – which
could include Oman and Kuwait.
With countries such as Turkey and Pakistan seeking to balance
relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran, albeit unconvincingly at times,
this third axis is slowly emerging. Heavy-handed measures such as the
current siege on Qatar are increasingly forcing smaller states to
unhappily choose sides, accelerating the development of a third path,
even if informally. Iran has offered to export food to Qatar from
Iranian ports – which are around 200 nautical miles from Doha, and
commenced food exports to Qatar to replace its reliance on Saudi
Arabia. Turkey has instituted similar measures. Recep Tayyip Erdogan
has defended Qatar, opposing the sanctions, and dispatching
planeloads of food. Ankara also accelerated
and adopted two parliamentary bills endorsing the deployment of
troops to its base in Qatar and joint training and cooperation with
Qatari military personnel. In addition, Qatari Naval vessels have
been allowed to dock at Omani ports, while Kuwaiti diplomatic
pronouncements implicitly allude to the Monarch’s support for Doha.
These have allowed Doha to weather the storm relatively intact.
Doha’s stock market has stabilised, while the economic embargo has
to date not led to severe food shortages. Although Eritrea and
Djibouti recently downgraded ties with Doha, the diplomatic fallout
has been contained, and to date global powers such as the US, France,
Russia, and China continue to maintain the same levels of diplomatic
representation as before. More significantly, states with large
Muslim populations such as Pakistan, Indonesia and Nigeria, and even
the kingdom of Morocco have remained neutral
It is, however, debatable whether these countries together are
strong enough to form such a coalition in opposition to the KSA- and
Iran-led axes.
The increasing tension also indicates a
weakening of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which was
established in 1981 to ensure unity and coordination among Gulf
countries, as a response to the 1979 Iranian revolution. Although GCC
countries have been coordinating
on regional policing, established the Peninsula Shield
Force military arm, and signed agreements on economic and taxation
matters, the organisation has been increasingly fragmented by
different stances of individual states. In 2013, for example, Oman
was widely criticised for hosting secret negotiations between Iran
and the USA, prior to the nuclear deal; in 2014, Oman and Kuwait
refused to recall their ambassadors from Qatar; and in 2016, when KSA
severed ties with Iran, Bahrain was the only GCC member to follow
suit. No matter how the current crisis ends, the GCC will emerge
weaker. If Qatar refuses to capitulate, that could spell the end of
the council. This is especially since Oman is already regarded as an
outlier, and because Kuwait has had to balance its relations with
Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, with which it shares a border.
